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The Evolution of Iranian Islamism
from the Revolution Through the
Contemporary Reformers
ABSTRACT

This Note explores the evolution and maturation of Iranian
Islamism from the revolutionary elites through the
contemporary reformers of the 21st century. The Author
examines the conflicting ideological influences that are shaping
the Islamist movement in Iran. This Note begins by presenting
the framework of the fundamental contradictionsthat underlie
The analysis of the Iranian
Iranian Islamist ideology.
Constitution is divided into an exploration of the institutional
role of the clerical elites in the form of the faqih and the Council
of Guardians, the constitutionally defined role of women, the
democratic elements in the Iranian Constitution, and Marxism
and environmentalism in the Constitution. The Note then
addresses the maturation of the Iranian Islamist movement
including attempts to reinvigoratethe power of the conservatives
beyond Khomeini, the election to Khatami, the women's rights
movement, the philosophy of democratic Islamism, and the
clerical backlash against the reform movement.
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I. INTRODUCTION

This Note addresses the legal philosophy of the Islamist
movement in Iran. The movement is traced from its rise to power to
contemporary fissures in the system, that divide reformers from
many clerical elites. One goal of this Note is to determine what
internal legal reforms the Islamist movement aims to achieve. This
Note centrally argues that Iranian Islamism is trapped within a
series of legal paradoxes resulting from the clashing, and not always
congealing, elements of democratic values, Platonistic philosophy,
and a variety of modernist intellectual movements including
environmentalism and Marxist economics, that are all read within
the framework of the Islamist interpretation of Islam itself. The
discussion explores two possible resolutions of this contradiction.
One possibility is that the contradiction will be resolved extremely
slowly through unevenly paced progress and struggle toward
democratic reform within the context of, and perhaps limited to, the
internal law of Iran.' A second, starker possibility is the continued
tyrannical subjugation of democratic elements of the Islamist
movement by absolutist clerical rule.
This Note also strives to answer the question of whether an
Islamist State can exist as a democratic state. Iran stands as an
example of what Islamist revolutionaries seek to achieve in enacting
and enforcing their conception of Islamic law, sharia. The course of
Iranian political development over the past two decades provides
insight into the impact of Islamist rule on a society and the changing
nature of the movement itself. The Revolution that swept the Pahlavi
dynasty out of power and Khomeini into power stands within the
minds of its architects as both an example for Islamist reform, and a
platform for spreading further Islamist reform and revolution in the

1.
This Note will not explore in depth Iranian foreign policy or the issue the
Islamic Republic's involvement with Hamass, Hezbollah, or any other terrorist
organization.
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Muslim world. Its leaders believe that their revolution is not to be
confined to Iran. Quite to the contrary, they believe that it will be
exported and imported wherever the umma, or religious community
of Islam, exists. More than 20 years after the 1979 Revolution, there
are two extremely plausible interpretations of the course of the
Islamist movement. Perhaps democracy, an element external or
internal to Islam, was originally planted in the foundations of
Islamism and is emerging, although extremely slowly, as a far more
potent element of the Iranian revolution than it had been.
Alternatively, corresponding with Samuel Huntington's paradigm of
the Clash of Civilizations, democracy cannot survive in an Islamist
state. Under this latter interpretation, democracy's appearance on
the Iranian political stage is merely transitory, a fleeting moment of
hope.

II. THE ISLAMIST REVOLUTION AND RULE IN THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF
IRAN
"The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran is full of
contradictions which, viewed in their totality, reflect the
extraordinary range of political forces involved in the Iranian
revolution and the particular constellation of power that existed...
-"2 One of the fundamental contradictions of the Iranian Constitution
is that the document, which is supposed to serve as the basis for the
ideal and pure Islamic State, "incorporates many non-Islamic and
non-legalist elements."3 This would not be a contradiction, but for the
added complication that Islamist, 4 Islamic5 legalists 6 "claim that a

2.

ASGHAR SCHIRAZI, THE CONSTITUTION OF IRAN: POLITICS AND THE STATE IN

THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC 1 (John O'Kane trans., 1997). The Iranian Revolution united
for a brief period of time a wide array of forces from radical Marxist leftists to
conservative clerics in opposition to the Shah and the Pahlavi dynasty. Id.
3.
Id.
4.
BOBBY S. SAYYID, A FUNDAMENTAL
EMERGENCE OF ISLAMISM 17 (1997).

FEAR:

EUROCENTRISM

AND THE

fAin Islamist is someone who places her or his Muslim identity at the center of
her or his political practice. That is, Islamists are people who use the language
of Islamic metaphors to think through their political destinies, those who see
Islam in their political future. This should not be taken to mean that there are
no shades of opinion within Islamism, that it is some kind of monolithic edifice
without variation or internal differences. Islamists are no more (or less)
identical in their beliefs and motives than postmodern bourgeois liberals or
socialists or nationalists.
Id. Islamism is, also, a form of political discourse that attempts to center Islam within
the political order assuring its growth and vitality. This ordering ranges from a mere
subjective preference that people act in accordance with Islamic principles to actual
attempts to reconstruct and enforce Islamic principles and ideals.
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state set up on the basis of Shi'i law and ruled by Islamic jurists
(foqaha) is capable of offering solutions to all problems not only in
Iran, but throughout the world" utilizing interpretations of religious
texts

as the

exclusive

model for governance.

7

A

"second

.

contradiction [is] between [the Iranian Constitution's] democratic and
anti-democratic elements, arising chiefly from conflict between two
notions of sovereignty embodied in the document: the sovereignty of
the people on the one hand and of the Islamic jurists on the other, a

sovereignty that the jurists exercise as God's deputies. '8
It is
basically undisputed, however, that the structure of the Islamic
Republic, as framed by the Constitution consisting of both Islamic
and Republican elements, was designed to be dominated by the
religious jurists acting in accordance with the sharia,or Islamic law,
rather than conforming with the principles of popular sovereignty. 9
Asghar Schirazi, a scholar of the .Iranian Constitution,
postulated the existence of a third contradiction between "those

5.
Id. at 31-51, 78.
Islamism is used a modifier, rather than as
interchangeable with the word Islam because the two are not the same. One,
Islamism, is essentially a movement directed at political action, legal reform, etc.; the
other, Islam, is a religion, Although Islamism is often an attempt to re-articulate
Islam as the laws that govern a society, the two are not the same, and not all Muslims
are Islamists.
6.

SCHIRAZI, supra note 2, at 2-3.

The committed hierocratic legalists are defined as those Who advocated the
mandate of the jurist (velayat-e faqih), in particular as understood by
Khomeini. They supported the adoption of shari'a as the juridical basis for the
state, and held various orthodox positions on the adaption of this system to "the
demands of the times."
Id.; see also JOHN L. ESPOSITO, IsLAM: THE STRAIGHT PATH 74-75 (3d ed. 1998). To
many Muslims, law is not simply a system of rules codified by legislatures or
promulgated by monarchs; rather, in the Islamic world, law possesses not the almost
sub-conscious entwinement it has with religion in the West, but a conscious and
deliberate connection. In Islam, law is religion and forms identity.
Law is the primary religious science in Islam. Once committed to Islam the
believer's overriding concern and question is "What do I do; what is God's
will/law." Law is essentially religious, the concrete expression of God's guidance
(sharia, path or way) for humanity. Throughout history, Islamic law has
remained central to Muslim identity and practice, for it constitutes the ideal
social blueprint for the "good society." The Sharia has been a source of law and
moral guidance, the basis for both law and ethics. Despite vast cultural
differences, Islamic law has provided an underlying sense of identity, a
common code of behavior, for Muslim societies. As a result, the role of Islamic
law in Muslim society has been and continues to be a central issue for the
community of believers.
Id.
7.
8.
9.
in IRAN AT

SCHIRAZI, supra note 2, at 1.
Id.
Mohsen M. Milani, Reform and Resistance in the Islamic Republic of Iran,
THE CROSSROADS 30 (John L. Esposito & R.K. Ramazani eds., 2001).
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Islamic legalist elements in the constitution which support a
hierarchy and its Islamic anti-hierocratic elements."'10 Nevertheless,
Schirazi argued that the anti-hierocratic elements "are based on a
conception of Islam which has assimilated significantly greater
democratic and secular attitudes, [thus] this contradiction can be
seen as corresponding for the most part to the contradiction between
the legalist [(more traditional Islamic elements)] and the democratic,
secular elements."" Thus, he contends that the fundamental tension
in the Iranian Constitution is the internal elements opposing the
external elements. 12 Stated differently, the basic friction is between
promulgating law relying exclusively on Islam as defined by, the
Islamists, and promulgating law that incorporates elements from
external sources of law-mainly democratic values and modernist
ideologies such as Marxist economic theory and environmentalismthat are frequently contradictory with traditional Islamic law. The
external secular and democratic elements and the Islamic legalist
components of the Iranian Constitution "have not been adapted to one
another in a harmonious way, but appear in one and the same text as
elements that contradict and exclude one another."'1 3
As an
illustration, "[t]he sovereignty of the Islamic jurists negates the
sovereignty of the people, the Islamic community is set over against
the Iranian nation, Islamic regulations and principles limit the rights
of the people, the Guardian Council deprives parliament of power, the
leader suppresses the president, [and] the concept of velayat-e faqih
14
reduces the idea of a republic to absurdity.'
A. The Constitutionof Islamic Republic
The Iranian Constitution contains numerous and pervasive
allusions throughout its preamble and 175 articles to various Islamic
elements, which possess several prominent general characteristics. 15
First, the Islamic elements establish that "the state and the
revolution leading to the creation of that state are Islamic."'1 6 Second,
"[t]hey define the tasks and the goals of the state in accordance with
its Islamic character.' 7
Third, "[t]hey bind legislation to the
sharia.' 8 Fourth, "[t]hey ensure that positions of leadership will be

10.
11.

SCHIRAZI, supra note 2, at 1.
Id.

12.

Id.

13.
14.

SCHIRAZI, supra note 2, at 19.
Id.

15.
Id. at 8.
16.
Id.
17.
Id.
18.
Id. "The literal meaning of Sharia is 'the road to the watering hole,' the
clear, right, or straight path to be followed. In Islam, it came to mean the divinely
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reserved to Islamic jurists." 19 Fifth, "[tjhey place Islamically defined
restrictions on the democratic rights of individuals, of the nation and
of ethnic groups." 20 Sixth, "[t]hey set up institutions whose task it is
These general
to ensure the Islamic character of the State."' 21
an ideal
goal:
forming
one
toward
characteristics are all directed
22
Republic.
Islamic
The Constitution of Iran explicitly provides that the "form of
' 23
The
government of Iran is that of an Islamic Republic.
Constitution defines an "Islamic Republic [as] a system of
government based on belief in":
the one God (as stated in the Islamic creed "There is no god but
a.
God"), His exclusive possession of sovereignty and the right to legislate,
and the necessity of submission to his commands;
b.
divine revelation and its fundamental role in the expounding of
laws;
c.
the return to God in the hereafter, and the constructive role of
this belief in man's ascending progress toward God;
d.

the justice of God in creation and legislation;

e.
continuous leadership and guidance, and its fundamental role in
assuring the continuity of the revolution of Islam;
f.
the exalted dignity and value of man, and his freedom, joined to
responsibilities, before God;

which secures equity, justice, political, economic, social and cultural
independence, and national solidarity, by recourse to:
24
continuous ijtihad of the fuqaha possessing the necessary
a.
qualifications, exercised on the basis of the Book of God and the Sunna
of the Masumin, upon all of whom be peace;

recourse to arts and sciences and the most advanced results of
b.
human experience, together with the effort to carry them still farther
forward;
c.
rejection of all forms of oppression, both the infliction and
endurance of it, and of dominance, both its imposition and
acceptance.25

Many of the goals delineated in the Iranian Constitution are
explicitly Islamic. "Among its goals are: the foundation of 'an
exemplary society' with the assistance of 'Islamic ideals,' 'the

mandated path, the straight path of Islam, that Muslims were to follow, God's will or
law." ESPOSITO, supra note 6, at 78.
19.
SCHIRAZI, supra note 2, at 8.
Id.
20.
Id.
21.
22.
Id.
23.

IRAN CONST. art. 1, reprinted in CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC

OF IRAN (Hamid Algar trans., 1980).
24.
ESPOSITO, supra note 6, at 83. Ijtihad is interpretation by jurists of Islamic
law relating to questions about the meaning of Quranic text and traditions.
25.

IRAN CONST. art. 2.
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realization of the movement's religious principles,' 'the achievement
of prerequisite' on the basis of which man will be formed with the
help of 'lofty and universal Islamic values."' 26 In a bow to its
precursors, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, the Iranian
Revolutionaries wrote into the Constitution that the realization of
these goals "is not merely ... for the Iranian people but for Muslims
throughout the world, and all those in the world who have been
deprived of their rights (mostaz'afin)." 27 In fulfilling this duty to the
umma, or religious community of Muslims, "what is to be striven for
is 'smoothing the way to establishing a single world-wide religious
28
community.'

26.

SCHIRAZI, supra note 2, at 9-10.

27.
SCHIRAZI, supra note 2, at 10. See also SYDNEY NETTLETON FISHER &
WILLIAM OCHSENWALD, THE MIDDLE EAST: A HISTORY 540-42 (5th ed. 1997). The
Muslim Brotherhood was founded in 1929 by Hasan al-Banna, a young teacher, who
lived in the Suez Canal Zone. Id.
[T]he Muslim Brotherhood grew under the founder's fiery oratory and positive
approach to a personal and social religion. He exhorted his followers to return
to the Islam of the prophet Muhammad, which meant an acceptance of the
Quran as the basic law of society. He desired to make Egypt, as well as other
Muslim lands, an Islamic theocracy and to stop the trend toward a secular
state. But the true strength of the Muslim Brotherhood lay not so much in its
ideology as in the energy, devotion, and ruthlessness of its leaders.
In its early years the Muslim Brotherhood maintained an active program of
social welfare and agricultural cooperatives; in its later years it became more
militant. Its goal became the remaking of society into a manifestation of Hasan
al-Banna's uncompromising concept of early Islamic life. . . . Reprisals,
pressure, assassination, and armed gangs gave the Muslim Brotherhood power,
and its actions attracted youth yearning for an active course to follow.
The secular Egyptian government found the Muslim Brotherhood a serious
threat and took measures against it, leading to the assassination of the prime
minister in 1948. When Hasan al-Banna was murdered, the government took
no serious steps to identify his assailants. In 1951 permission was given to
reactivate the Brotherhood on the condition that its semi-military activities be
discontinued.

Id.
28.
Id. (citing Quran verse 21:92, "This is your community. It is the only
community. And I am your Lord. Serve Me!"). Cf. BASSAM TIBI, THE CHALLENGE OF
FUNDAMENTALISM:

POLITICAL ISLAM AND THE NEW WORLD DISORDER 48 (1998).

Bassam Tibi asserts that many ". . . Arab fundamentalists not only have denied the
'Islamic Revolution' in Iran (a non-Arab country) a legitimate claim to lead the
umma/universal Islamic community but are also applying their neo-absolutism to
Islamic civilization itself." Id. The neo-absolutism Tibi refers to is the contention that
Arab scholars and states should define Islam throughout the worldwide Muslim
community. See id. at 46-50.
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1. Velayat-e Faqih (Rule by the Jurist) or the Foqaha and the Council
of Guardians
"But now we approach the most important business in the city,
the task of guardians." 29 The faqih or foqaha and the Council of
Guardians are a merger of Platonistic philosophy and Islamist
ideology, and are charged with the responsibility of creating and
preserving an ideal Islamic state. 30 The special role of religious
leaders, Khomeini's Guardians of the Republic, in directing, guiding,
31
and preserving the state is the centerpiece of Khomeini's writings.
In his political discourses on the ideal Islamic state, Khomeini argued
that "there should be no separation between religion and government
in an Islamic state."3 2 In establishing a theocratic state, Khomeini
contended that the clergy provided the only legitimate guardians of
the Republic, standing as heirs to the mantle of leadership passed
from the Prophet Mohammed through the imams.33 According to

29.

PLATO, THE REPUBLIC § 374d (Richard W. Sterling and William C. Scott

trans., 1985).

Sanusi L. Sanusi, Jihad: Revolutionary Islam and Nigerian Democracy,
30.
Niger Delta Congress, at http://www.nigerdeltacongress.com/jarticles/jihad.htm (last
visited Nov. 6, 2002).
Khomeini's Islamic Republic, which vests absolute power in the infallible JurisConsult is not different from Plato's Republic ruled absolutely by the
Philosopher-King, or even from the Catholic State run by the infallible Pope.
[Ayatollah] Mutahhari's general theory of the dictatorship of the Ulema
expresses the same suspicion of the capacity of the "masses" to know what is
right for them that Plato's teacher, the "Great Master" Socratres, had
expressed about the democracy of Sparta, and mirrors the latter's preference
for a dictatorship of philosophers.
The Philosopher, the Pope and the Faqih are all human beings presumed to
have acquired knowledge of the ideal society[,] who are entrusted with the
responsibility of moving their people towards its by force, if necessary. The
Philosopher King is selected by other philosophers, the Faqih by the Ulema or
Council of Guardians, the Pope by the [College] of Cardinals.
Id.; Daniel H. Frank, Journal of Islamic Philosophy, Political Philosophy in Classical
Frank
Islam (1998), available at http://www.muslimphilosophy.com/rep/HO12.htm.
argues that "what we find in the Islamic political philosophers are variations on
standard Platonic themes, pre-eminently the notion of the prophet as an analogue to
the Platonic philosopher-king, the ambiguous role of philosophy in the practical
political sphere, and the deep division between an elite and the vulgar masses." Id.
Neil Shevlin, Note, Velayat-e Faqih in the Constitution of Iran: The
31.
Implementation of Theocracy, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 358, 365 (1998) (indicating that
Velayat-e Faqih "codified ... [Khomeini's] view of the relationship between Islam and
the state.... [The] work[,] . .. a compendium of lectures delivered by Khomeini to his
students in the city of Najaf, Iraq in 1969").
32.
Id. (citing HOMA OMID, ISLAM AND THE POST-REVOLUTIONARY STATE OF
IRAN 62 (1994)).
33.
Id. (citing OMID, supra note 32 at 5). "In Shii Islam[, the term imam] refers
to the successor of Prophet Muhammad, descendant of Ali, who governs as [a] divinely
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Khomeini, "the imam . . . designated the foqaha [(elite religious
justices)] . . . to exercise the functions of both government and

judgeship. '34 In this position of power, religious leaders were riot to
create new law; rather, they were simply to engage in a search to
maintain or discover the true law, or sharia, spoken by God to the
Prophet Mohammed. 35 Therefore, "Islamic government differed from
secular forms [of government] in that 'the power of legislation ' is
36
confined to God . . . and nobody else has the right to legislate.'

Under Khomeini's vision of the Islamic state, the government is
to be "led either by a single member of the clergy, faqih [(a
philosopher king)], or by a group of clergy, foqaha (a small group of
guardians). '37 Whether there is to be one supreme ruler or a small
group of ruling elites is determined by the answer to the philosophical
and pragmatic question of whether the "competence for this task is
confined to one person. '38 If there is someone who is capable, "then
this would be his duty to do so corporeally, otherwise the duty is
shared equally." 39 Two absolute essentials for the ruler or rulers are
about Islamic law, sharia,and
that he or they must be knowledgeable
40
possess an acumen for justice.
Khomeini's understanding of the powers that should be granted
to such a ruler was quite expansive. He indicated that such a ruler
"will have as much control over running the people's administration,
welfare and policy as the Prophet. '4 1 Khomeini's vision of the faqih is
of a paternalistic relationship between the ruler and his people with
"the task of a trustee over an entire people .

.

. not [being] different

from that of the trustee over minors, except quantitatively. '42 In
other words, it is not that the ruler has any less responsibility or
control over the citizens of the State than a parent over a minor child;
rather, the ruler simply has many more children.

inspired religio[usf]political leader of [the] Islamic community." ESPOSITO, supra note
6, at 250.
34.
Id. (citing OMID, supra note 32, at 60).
35.
Id. at 366.
36.

Id.

(citing AYATOLLAH RUHOLLAH KHOMEINI, IsLAMIc GOVERNMENT

17

(Joint Publication Research Service trans., 1979)).
37.
Id. (citing Said Saffari, The Legitimation of the Clergy's Right to Rule in the
Iranian Constitution of 1979, BRIT. J. OF MIDDLE E. STUD., 1993, at 67 (describing the
institutionalization of Khomeni's teachings, Velayat e- Faqih, as the law of Iran in the
1979 Constitution)).
38.
Id. (citing KHOMEINI,.supra note 36, at 22).
39.
Id; (citing KHOMEINI, supra note 36, at 22).
40.
Id. (citing KHOMEINI, supra note 36, at 19, 20, 35).
Id. (citing KHOMEINI, supra note 36, at 21-22).
41.
42.
Id. (citing KHOMEINI, supra note 36, at 21-22). Khomeini believed that this
paternalistic government is necessary because of his view that "the people are,
generally, 'devout, simple-minded and intellectually docile."' Id. (citing OMID, supra
note 32, at 63).
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Despite the theoretical importance of the faqih to Khomeini, the
draft of the new Iranian Constitution prepared by the Provisional
Government-part of the dual system of Government formed after
the Revolution, composed primarily of secular liberals 4 3-did not
contain any reference to the position or institution of the faqih or the
foqaha.44 Furthermore, the Council of Guardians, although charged
under this proposed Constitution with passing on the Islamic
correctness of laws promulgated by the legislature, nevertheless
possessed only limited veto powers, and most of its members were to
be lay judges, not Islamic clerical jurists. 45 The Revolutionary
Council 46 and Khomeini originally approved of this draft of the
Constitution, providing that the provisions allowing women to hold
the position of president or a judgeship were removed. 47 Protest,
however, arose from conservative elements of the religions clerics,
ulama, regarding the role of religious leaders after Khomeini and the
concentration of power in democratic rather than religious based
institutions. 48 These arguments ultimately convinced Khomeini that
the original Constitution was insufficiently Islamic. 49 Hence, a call
was issued for redrafting the proposed Constitution and restructuring
the model for the proposed government.5" The Islamic Republican
Party (IRP) won most of the seats in the elected Assembly of Experts
that was to redraft the Constitution. 51 With this victory, the IRP

43.

Id.

at 367 (citing NIKKIE R. KEDDIE, INTRODUCTION TO THE IRANIAN

REVOLUTION & THE IsLAMIc REPUBLIC 11 (Nikkie R. Keddi & Eric Hoogland eds.,
1986)).
44.
Id. at 367-68 (citing SHAUL BAKHASH, THE REIGN OF THE AYATOLLAHS: IRAN
AND THE IsLAMIc REVOLUTION 74 (1984)).

45.
Id.
46.
Id. The Revolutionary Council was the religious element of the dual system
government that controlled Iran following the 1979 revolution. It was considered to be
more influential, powerful, and conservative than the Provisional Government. See id.
47.
Id. (citing OMID, supra note 32, at 66 (suggesting that Khomeini supported
the Constitution, despite its omission of any reference to the faqih, because he felt that
the position of faqih would "emerge as a matter of course" and that people of Iran
would, nevertheless, "obey his every command")).
48.
Id. at 368. (citing Saffari, supra note 36, at 67); see also id. (citing OMID,
supra note 32, at 66).
49.
Id. (citing Saffari, supra note 36, at 67); see also id. (citing OMID, supra
note 32, at 66). "Khomeini reacted by 'publicly criticizing the draft constitution for
being insufficiently Islamic."'
His supporters came to his aid by 'stressing the
requirement of adhering to the rule by Faqih as the sine qua non,' of the new Islamic
society." Id. (internal citations omitted).
50.
Id. at 368-69.
51.
Id. (citing BAKHASH, supra note 44, at 81).
During the ensuing campaign for seats in the Assembly of Experts, Khomeini's
Islamic Republican Party (IRP) presented the largest slate of candidates.
While its secular opposition "remained fragmented," and without a "coherent
agenda," the IRP skillfully utilized mosques and successfully publicized the
endorsements it had received from the clergy and Ayatollah Khomeini. As a
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endeavored to ensure that the Constitution would be "one hundred
52
percent Islamic."
The results of this endeavor included provisions creating
important, but not undisputed, constitutional roles 53 for the faqih and
Counsel of Guardians. Specifically, Article 5 of the Constitution of
the Islamic Republic of Iran provides for rule by the faqih or
alternatively the foqaha:
During the Occultation of the Lord of the Age (may God hasten his
54
the governance and leadership of the
renewed manifestation!),

result, the IRP won a landslide victory, securing more than two-thirds of the 73
seats up for election.
Id.
52.
Id. at 368-69 (citing BAKHASH, supra note 44, at 81).
53.
Id. at 369-70. See also id. at 370-71 (citing Saffari, supra note 36, at 71).
Critics of establishing the position of faqih or of granting the faqih broad powers
offered similar critiques. Ezzatollah Sahabi argued against the establishment of an
extremely powerful faqih on two grounds. Id. at 370. One, the faqih should not be
involved in day-to-day political activities simply because no one person has a broad
enough understanding to perform the role of total day-to-day governance in the modern
world. Id. The complexity of modern life concern was essentially an expression of the
sense of opposition figures such Sahabi and Hojatti Kermain that although Khomeini
and future religious leaders would be experts in religious matters that these religious
leaders lacked a sufficient understanding of social, economic, and legal matters. Id.
Two, Sahabi argued against the establishment of the faqih on a religious basis,
contending that "absolute rule belongs only to God and the infallible Imams; human
beings cannot be under the absolute rule of subjection of anyone except them." Id.
54.
See generally DANIEL BRUMBERG, REINVENTING KHOMEINI: THE STRUGGLE
FOR REFORM IN IRAN 43-44 (2001).

Although in A.D. 644 All [(first cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet
Mohammed)] was chosen as Caliph, he later relinquished the title; this act of
statesmanship cost him his life at the hands of assassins who accused him of
betraying the cause. His son Hoseyn then claimed the Caliphate, but was
killed by the Sunni Umayyad Caliph Yazid on the desert of Karbala, in presentday Iraq. In ensuing centuries Twelver Shi'ites asserted that because the ten
male descendants of Hoseyn had inherited a divine or supernatural knowledge
of the Qur'an, they were the only legitimate leaders, or Imams, of Muslims.
Since the Twelfth Imam was said to be in hiding or "occultation," Shi'ites
further argued that the creation of a fully legitimate Islamic state had to await
his return. In the interim legal scholars, or mojtaheds, became the defenders of
a persecuted minority at the hands of innately unjust rulers. While these
scholars were not viewed as bears of the Imam's infallible authority, their
knowledge of the law endowed them with considerable moral and judicial
Thus in contrast with the Imams, the
authority in their communities.
mojtaheds' central position in the Shi'ite community was based, first arid
foremost, on traditional rather than charismatic authority.
Id.; see also CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN 94 (Hamid Algar trans.,

1980) (interpreting occulation of the Lord of the Age as "the withdrawl from the
manifest plane of the Twelfth Imam in year 260[(Islamic calendar)]/874 [(A.D.)]; he will
return to this plane when God wills") [hereinafter Algar]. See JOHN L. ESPOSITO, THE
ISLAMIC THREAT: MYTH OR REALITY 102 (1995). "Iran's shahs claimed to rule in the
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nation devolve upon the just and pious faqih who is acquainted with
the circumstances of his age; courageous, resourceful, and possessed of
administrative ability; and recognized and accepted as leader by the
majority of the people. In the event that no faqih should be so
recognized by the majority, the leader, or the Leadership Council,
composed of fuqaha possessing the aforementioned qualifications, will
5
assume these responsibilities in accordance with Article 107. 5

A section of the Introduction to the Iranian Constitution entitled
"Governance of the Just Faqih" explains the need for this position:
"[t]he conduct of affairs is to be in the hands of those who are learned
concerning God and are trustworthy guardians of that which He has
permitted and that which He has forbidden. Such leadership will
prevent any deviation by the various organs of government from their
56
essential Islamic duties."
The constitutionally designated powers of the faqih or,
alternatively, the leadership council 57 under Article 110, are quite
expansive:
The leadership is to be assigned the following duties and powers:
a.

appointment of the fuqaha on the Council of Guardians;

b.

appointment of the supreme judicial authority of the country;

c. supreme command of the armed forces, exercised in the following
manner:
(i)

appointment and dismissal of the chief of the general staff;

(ii) appointment and dismissal of the commander-in-chief of the
Corps of Guards of the Islamic Revolution;
(iii) the formation of the Supreme National Defense Council,
composed of the following seven members
-

the President

absence of the Twelfth Imam, who had disappeared in 874 and whom devout Shii
believed would return in a future age to end tyranny and usher in a new age of justice.'!

Id.
IRAN CONST. art. 5.
55.
56.
Id. art. 107.
See generally id. art. 107. Article 107 of the Constitution of the Islamic
57.
Republic of Iran provides the process for the selection of the leader or alternatively the
leadership council. Id.
Whenever one of the fuqaha possessing the qualifications specified in Article 5
of the Constitution is recognized and accepted as marja' and leader by a
decisive majority of the people-as has been the case with the exalted marja'-i
taqlid and leader of the revolution, Ayatullah al-Uzma Imam Khomeini-he is
to exercise governance and a11the responsibilities arising therefrom. If such
should not be the case, experts elected by the people will review and consult
among themselves concerning all persons qualified to act as marja' and leader.
If they discern outstanding capacity for leadership in a certain marja', they will
present him to the people as their leader; if not, they will appoint either three
or five marja's possessing the necessary qualifications for leadership and
present them as members of the Leadership Council.
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the Prime Minister

-

the minister of defense

-

the chief of the general staff

-

the commander-in-chief of the Corps of Guards of the Islamic

Revolution
- two advisers appointed by the leader
(iv) appointment of the supreme commanders of the three branches
of the armed forces, based upon the recommendation of -the Supreme
National Defense Council;
(v) the declaration of war and peace, and the mobilization of
the armed forces, based on the recommendation of the Supreme
National Defense Council;
d. signing the decree [formalizing the election] of the President of the
Republic after his election by the people. The suitability of candidates
for the presidency of the Republic, with'respect to the qualifications
specified in the Constitution, must be confirmed before elections take
place by the Council of Guardians, and, in the case of the first term, by
the leadership;
e. dismissal of the President of the Republic, with due regard for the
interests of the country, after the issue of a judgement by the Supreme
Court convicting him of failure to fulfill his legal duties, or a vote of the
National
Consultative
Assembly
testifying to
his political
incompetence;
f.
pardoning or reducing the sentences of convicts, within the bounds
of Islamic criteria, after receiving a recommendation [to that effect]
58
from the Supreme Court.

The Iranian Constitution, however, does provide a mechanism for the
removal of members of the leadership council or even an individual
that had been selected as the faqih by the Assembly of Experts
pursuant to Article 111: "Whenever the leader or one member of the
Leadership Council becomes incapable of fulfilling the legal duties of
leadership, or loses one of the qualifications mentioned in Article 109,
he will be dismissed.
Determinations [of the necessity of such a
dismissal] will be made by the experts mentioned in Article 108. ' 59
Additionally, Article 91 of the Constitution of the Islamic
Republic of Iran and related provisions create an oversight body that
is assigned the responsibility of protecting both Islam as a religion
and the Iranian Constitution.60 Article 91 provides that "[i]n order to
protect the ordinances of Islam and the Constitution by assuring that
legislation passed by the National Consultative Assembly does not
conflict with t hem, a council to be known as the Council of Guardians
is to be established ....
*,61
The membership of the Council of
Guardians is composed of "six just fuqaha, conscious of the current

58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. art. 110.
Id. art. 111.
Id. art. 91.
Id.
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needs and the issues of the day, to be selected by the leader or the
Leadership Council; and six jurists, specializing in different areas of
law, to be elected by the National Consultative Assembly from among
'62
the Muslim jurists presented to it by the Supreme Judicial Council.
Every piece of "legislation passed by the National Consultative
Assembly must be sent to the Council of Guardians ... with a view to
ensuring its compatibility with the criteria of Islam and the
Constitution. If it finds the legislation not so compatible, it will
return it to the Assembly. '63 The Counsel of Guardians is also
charged with interpreting the Iranian Constitution, 64 supervising the
election of the President of the Republic and the National
Consultative Assembly, and consulting popular opinion and
referenda. 65 When considering the totality of the powers of the faqih
or foqaha and the Council of Guardians, it is apparent that a small
group of clerics effectively possess supremacy over the judicial,
legislative, and executive powers of government. 66
2. The Islamically-Defined Status and Role of Women in the Iranian
Constitution
This expansive constitutional authority of the ruling clerical elite
has enormous effects on the legal rights of Iranians, with women
67
particularly experiencing a prominent and disproportionate impact.

62.
Id.
63.
Id. art. 94. The Council of Guardians has ten days to determine if the law
meets the standards of Islamic law and adheres to the requirements of the
Constitution. Id. The Council can ask for an extension if it deems this time period to
be insufficient to make the necessary determinations. Id. art. 95. When considering
whether a piece of legislation meets the necessary Islamic ordinances, a majority vote
among the fuqaha, the religious cleric members of the Council, is determinative. Id.
art. 96. When addressing whether a law is constitutionally acceptable, a majority vote
among all members of the Council of Guardians, both the fuqaha and the lay jurists is
necessary. Id. art. 95.
64.
Id. art. 98 (indicating that this constitutional interpretation depends on
approval by three-fourths of its members).
65.
Id. art. 99.
66.
JOHN L. ESPOSITO & JOHN 0. VOLL, ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY 65 (1996)
(noting that the Iranian governmental "structure involves a complex balance of
authority and popular participation. [Nevertheless,] [a]t the apex of power were the
faqih, the Supreme Judicial Council, and the Council of Guardians of the Revolution.
They controlled the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government.
See generally SCHIRAZI, supra note 2, at 61-81.
67.
Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad, Islam, Women and Revolution in TwentiethCentury Arab Thought, in WOMEN, RELIGION AND SOCIAL CHANGE 275 (Yvonne
Yazbeck Haddad & Ellison Banks Findly eds., 1985). See also SCHIRAZI, supra note 2,
at 139-42 (explaining some of the limitations on women's rights following the
Islamicisation of Iranian society [the Islamist process of utilizing the force 'of law to
reshape society to conform more closely with their understanding of sharia or Islamic
law] and noting that "[t]he most blatant violations of the right of equality take the form
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The role of women in society is viewed by many of the leaders that
shaped Iranian law after the Revolution as a critical factor to the
development of an ideal Islamic state. 68 Many of these leaders
believe that women's "adherence to the precepts of religion ha[ve]
become a precondition for the survival of society. If women cease to
be religious or refuse to adhere to the prescriptions of Islam, there
can be no Islamic society. '69 In the cultural struggle envisioned by
many Islamists between Islam and the West, women are viewed as
the cornerstone and measure of the health and viability of Islamic
culture, but not because of Victorian notions of women's greater
virtue. 70 Instead, women are viewed as "the repository of the value
system in Islam. ' 71 The synthesis of this concept of women as the
cornerstone of a culture with the belief of many traditionalist Islamist
thinkers that women are morally weaker than men 72 leads many
Islamists to view the societal role of women as the principle
battleground in their struggle against the West:
Colonialism was fully aware of the sensitive and vital role of woman in
the formation of the individual and of human society. They considered
her the best tool for subjugation of the nations ... women serve as the
unconscious accomplices of the powers-to-be in the destruction of
73
indigenous culture to the benefit of the imperialists.

Consequently, "[t]o ensure women's devotion to Islam is therefore the

of legal discrimination against women and members of religious as well as ethnic
minorities").
68.
Haddad, supra note 67, at 275.
69.
Id. at 293.
70.
Compare id. at 275 (noting that "women have become the symbol of the
transformation of society, thus gaining status as bearers and maintainers of cultural
and religious values"), with CAROL BERKIN, FIRST GENERATIONS: WOMEN IN COLONIAL
AMERICA 202 (1996) (noting the discourse of the U.S. revolutionaries that "the mother,
not the masses . . . is the custodian of civic morality"). Although similar in many
respects to the Iranian concept of women as the measure of a culture, the American
founders view reflected more the concept of women as an ideal model for morality
because the American founders viewed women as more virtuous than men. As
evidenced by the fact that the founders believed that nature had "named [women]
guardians of virtues essential to the republic and socializing agents of the next
generation. Women were to embody and to impart to husbands what rhetoric of the
day called republican virtues-simplicity, honesty, and willingness to sacrifice for the
sake of the nation." Haddad, supra note 67, at 200.
71.
Id. at 293.
72.
Id. at 297 n.1 (citing ABBAS MAHMUD AL-'AQQAD, AL-MAR'A F1 AL-QUR'AN 30
(1959) ("Men are the sole source of every accepted definition of good conduct whether
for men or for women. Woman has never been a true source of anything to do with
ethics or good character even though she brings up the children. The guidelines are
provided by the male.")).
73.
Afsaneh Najmabadi, Feminism in an Islamic Republic: "Years of Hardship,
Years of Growth", in ISLAM, GENDER, AND SOCIAL CHANGE 60 (Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad
& John L. Esposito eds., 1998).

16P4

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 35.1679

'74

frontline defense against the disintegration of society.
With the status of women viewed as critical to the survival of
Islamic civilization, the role of women became an issue of
constitutional import and debate following the Revolution.
Furthermore, "[t]he interaction of concepts of the dependency,
weakness and vulnerability of the nation as a whole and of its women
is a powerful connection of metaphors and stands behind the special
attention the Constitution devotes to women." 75 In a section of the
Iranian Constitution entitled "Woman in the Constitution," the
traditional role of motherhood is given legal standing under a
paradigm of liberating women from the influence of imperialists and
expanding women's rights generally:
Woman in the Constitution
In the creation of Islamic social institutions, all elements of humanity
that hitherto served the multifaceted foreign exploitation of our country
are to regain their true identity and human rights. As a part of this
process, it is only natural that women should benefit from a
particularly large augmentation of their rights, because of the greater
oppression that they suffered under the despotic regime.
The family is the fundamental unit of society and the major center for
the growth and advancement of man. Compatibility with respect to
belief and ideal is the main consideration in the establishment of a
family, for the family provides the primary basis for man's development
and growth. It is the duty of Islamic government to provide the
necessary facilities for the attainment of this goal. This view of the
family unit delivers woman from being regarded as an object or as an
instrument in the service of consumerism and exploitation. Not only
does woman thereby recover her momentous and precious function of
motherhood, rearing alert and active human beings, she also becomes
the fellow struggler of man in all the different areas of life. Given the
weighty responsibilities that woman thus assumes, she is accorded in
Islam great' value and nobility. 76

The role of women in society, however, is not simply limited to
philosophical precepts and language in the introduction of
Constitution. Quite to the contrary, in Article 21, the Constitution
addresses specific constitutional obligations of the Islamic Republic to
Iranian women:
The governnent must assure the rights of women in all respects, in
conformity with Islamic criteria, and accomplish the following goals:
create' a favorable environment for the growth of woman's
a.
personality and the restoration of her rights, tangible and intangible;
b.
the protection of mothers, particularly during pregnancy and
childrearing, and the protection of children without guardians;

Haddad, supra note 67, at 293.
74.
William R. Darrow, Woman's Place and the Place of Women in the Iranian
75.
Revolution, in WOMEN, RELIGION AND SOCIAL CHANGE 309, 310 (Yvonne Yazbeck
Haddad & Ellison Banks Findly eds., 1985).
76.
Algar, supra note 54, at 21-22.
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c.
the creation of a competent court to protect and preserve the
family;
the provision of special insurance for widows and aged and
d.
destitute women;
the granting of guardianship of children to mothers whenever
e.
suitable in order to protect the interests of the children, in the absence
77
of a legal guardian.

These provisions dictate that women have a. special legal status
(there is no equivalent section on men); furthermore, women are
"implicitly identified as being a profession and envisioned as a
separate institution in society like the army and the clergy."7 8 The
Constitution's premise that women have suffered more than men
under the Shah's regime is based upon the idea that women were
"separated from their 'true identities' and ... made into objects at the
79
service of a Westernized consumerist and exploitative society.
The post-Revolution constitutional status of women resulted in
practical impact on the standing of women in society:
immediate
an
women judges were removed from the bench, women were legally
barred from studying certain disciplines in higher education, and
veiling was no longer a matter of individual choice but instead was
enforced by the state.80 The Islamist government suspended the
Family Protection Act laws of 1967 and 1975.81 These laws had
created a series of courts that had jurisdiction over child custody,
divorce, and other family law issues that aimed to assure greater
protections for women both in terms of the regularity of the process
and underlying substantive rights.8 2 The government established a
new set of courts that would deal with disputed divorces. 83 In cases
that were undisputed, however, a husband could divorce his wife
without court oversight or approval as long as two male witnesses
In considering family law issues, the judges,
were present.8 4
pursuant to directives from the Council of Guardians, were no longer
allowed to rely on the Civil Code. 8 5 Instead, judgements were to be

77.
IRAN CONST. art. 21.
Darrow, supra note 75, at 309.
78.
79.
Id.
Najmabadi, supra note 73, at 61.
80.
Darrow, supra note 75, at 316 (noting that the Family Protection Acts of
81.
1967 and 1975 altered "some of the most severe legal impediments to women in the
areas of marriage and divorce").
PARVIN PAIDAR, WOMEN AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS IN TWENTIETH82.
CENTURY IRAN 271 (1995).
Id. at 272.
83.
84.
Id. Under this non-dispute registry system, husbands merely need two
male witness to sign a register indicating that the man's wife does not dispute the
divorce in order for a divorce to be legally granted. Id.
Id. at 273.
85.
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based on the sharia.86 As a result, Kermani, the head of the family
law courts, altered the age of consent for marriage from the Civil
Code standard, which changed the age from 15 for girls and 18 for
87
Another error in legal
boys to the age of 9 for girls and 15 for boys.
interpretation under the Civil Code that the Council of Guardians
88
believed needed to be remedied were the laws regulating polygamy.
The Council of Guardians understood the right of a financially
capable man to take an additional wife or wives to be unconstrained
by force of law; Civil Code, however, required the first wife's
permission to be given in order for the subsequent marriage to be
legal.8 9 Nevertheless, the legislation and directives on a variety of
similar issues disseminated by various administrators were unclear,
90
As a
thereby causing mounting levels of administrative confusion.
result, litigants experienced "inconsistent decisions by judges, lack of
clarity in the law, and an absence of legislation to enforce the courts'
91
decisions."
In addressing marriage, the Islamic Republic of Iran
focused on .. .marriage as the only legitimate site of sexual pleasure
and reproduction .... To achieve this, the state adopted a number of
strategies: the minimum age of marriage was lowered, restriction on
polygamy was removed; financial assistance was offered to newly wed
couples, and a campaign was waged on the virtues of marriage and
92
Islamic matrimonial rights.

The results were often negative for women. The confusing and
contradictory foundations for family law in the Republic led to an
official compromise that set the age of marriage at 13 for girls; the
enforced reality was that younger girls were allowed to marry based
93
on a clerical judge's determination that they were mature enough.
The result was that girls as young as 10 or 11 were married by
94
The suspension of
clerical judges if they had begun to menstruate.
the Family Protection Law also meant that a man could marry up to
four permanent wives without needing to obtain consent from his
first wife. 95 Furthermore, the Islamic Republic favored by law the
practice of sigheh, marriage by contract to last for a set period of time,
which was officially disfavored by force of law and socially disdained
under the Pahlavi dynasty. 96 The State, but not society, encouraged

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id. at

275-76.
277.

277-78.
278, 367. Sigheh is
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a proliferation of the practice of sigheh marriages in three different
forms. 97 First, sexual sigheh was aimed at relieving sexual impulses,
particularly for unmarried men, although married men used this
practice as well. 98 Second, procreational sigheh was based on the fact
that any child born through this type of relationship was legitimate
as a matter of law. 9 9 Third, non-sexual sigheh was directed at
breaking down the segregated living situation in order to protect
women traveling from home and to allow unmarried people to get to
know each other in a form of dating without the woman's honor being
undermined.10 0 The State also began a propaganda campaign to
encourage marriage that focused both on younger people, encouraging
them to wed, and on their parents to encourage them to approve of a
potential daughter-in-law or son-in-law.' 0 1 The government declared
that marriages and reproduction would warrant both financial and
heavenly rewards.10 2 To further its policy, the State established
charities to provide economic incentives for marriage, and required

[ulsed as both [a] name and verb for temporary marriage[s]. It is a practice
which is confined to the Shii branch of Islam, in which every man in entitled to
have as many sigheh wives as he wishes. It is a form of marriage based on a
contract, which is bound by a time limit of between one hour to ninety-nine
years. Its aim is satisfaction of sexual urges, but children born in sigheh
marriages are legitimate.
Id. at 366.
97.
Id. at 278.
The cultural acceptability of sigheh, too, remained in question. Despite the
official propagation of the philosophy of sigheh and its proliferation in practice,
A well-documented study of sigheh
it remained socially stigmatized.
demonstrated that the pre-revolutionary attitude of disdain towards sigheh
resulting from its conceptual association with prostitution persisted in the
Islamic Republic. Those who practiced it tended to keep their activities secret
and this also applied to the clerics who fervently defended its philosophy.
Cultural disapproval of sigheh prevented its legitimization ....
...

Id. at 285-86.
98.
Id. It has been reported that
[s]exual sigheh was also applied as a means of both repentance and
punishment. Prostitutes detained in rehabilitation centers were encouraged to
become sigheh to revolutionary guards and many did so willingly or
unwillingly. In prisons too, virgin women prisoners were forced into sigheh
with their jailors before being executed, since according to [the State's]
religious beliefs they [(the prisoners)] would otherwise go to heaven.
Id. at 278.
99.
Id.
100.
Id.
101.
Id. at 279.
Id. Women were informed by state propaganda that veterans from the
102.
Iran-Iraq War had a special place in heaven, and that the women who married them
would share these other-worldly rewards with their husbands. Id.
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03
banks to provide special marriage loans.'
When addressing the issue of educating women, Khomeini "gave

consistent support to women's education . . . telling women '[to]

endeavor for knowledge and piety.' 10 4 He noted that "[k]nowledge is
not the monopoly of a particular group but belongs to all and it is the
duty of all men and women to acquire knowledge. I hope the
and
authorities will assist you in this and provide educational
10 5
cultural facilities that you need to enable you to succeed.'
The educational institutions for women and men had to be
thoroughly Islamicized, however, before attendance could be
The task of structurally conforming the educational
allowed. 106

103.

Id.

The Emam's Aid Committee (Komiteh Emdad Emam) announced that 3 per
cent of all household goods produced in the country will be allocated to this
committee by the Ministry of Trade exclusively for sale as dowries to couples
who were to be married. The Islamic Republic Services Foundation announced
that a grant loan of 100,000 to 500,000 rials would be offered to the newly
The Bank of Mellat, too, offered a special marriage loan to
married.
professionals such as teachers.

Id.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 312-13.
Id. at 313.
Id. at 313-14.

• . . The Islamic Republic devised a "cultural revolution" to overcome the
differentiation between secular and religious education by bringing the
mainstream education system under Islamic control. The other purpose served
by the cultural revolution was to bring the universities, which had become
major centers of left-wing political activity during and after the Revolution,
under state control. The cultural revolution started in April 1980 when
Ayatollah Khomeini criticized the universities for their Westernized professors,
students and text-books. He expressed a fear of the Islamic Republic being
undermined by "Westernized universities and the training of our youth in the
interest of the West or East." The Council of the Revolution decided to close
down the universities in order to eradicate un-Islamic influences. This resulted
in bloody clashes on university campuses between hezbollahis and other
students. Three days of fighting over the control of the universities lead to the
death and injury of hundreds of students and the evacuation of antigovernment secular and Islamic political groups from the universities.
President Banisadr proclaimed the start of a cultural revolution to Islamisize
the higher education system. Universities remained closed for two years while
the High Council of Cultural Revolution, consisting of seven members mostly
from the IRP, Islamisized the education system. ...
The Islamisation of the education system consisted of a number of measures
To begin with, the education
applied to various levels of education.
establishment was coerced into total submission to Islamic ideology. Teachers,
lecturers and administrators either agreed to carry the banner of Islamisation
or faced dismissal. Islamic student associations played an important role in
keeping the pressure on the staff and students of educational institutions.
After the reopening of the universities in 1982, the criteria for admission of
students included ideological commitment to the Islamic Republic, and . . .
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system to the Islamist's movement's view of public sphere gender
10 7
It
segregation was assigned to the Ministry of Education.
abolished coeducational schools, banned gender-integrated classes in
private schools, and enforced gender segregation in universities.108
Although the rhetoric and intentions of the ruling elite seemed to
reflect a genuine desire to assure access to quality education for both
men and women, the administration of the law reflected an enormous
Economic stagnation, when combined with
gender disparity. 10 9
teacher shortages, meant that insufficient funds and instructors were
available to provide education to men and women separately. 110 The
State's response was not to integrate classes and schools. Instead,
many girls, particularly in rural areas, were dismissed from schools
entirely, while girls in urban areas were forced into overcrowded and
under-supplied institutions.1 11
Furthermore, the State required wearing the hejab, or modest
Islamic dress including a head-cover and sometimes a veil, that
conformed to official government modesty standards for girls over the
age of nine. 112 Schools that permitted violations were subject to
prosecution and closure. 113 Also, teachers and administrators at girls'
schools were subject to immediate dismissal for failure to wear the
hejab.114 Women sympathetic to the regime were encouraged by the
State's propaganda machine to keep close oversight over the
appearance of the students and the content of the classroom teaching
in girls' schools, in order to ensure that it was appropriately
115
Islamic.
Segregation in education did not stop with being taught in
separate physical locations; rather, the content of the education
A
varied between what was provided to men and women. 116

confirmation by the local mosque was required. Secondly, curricula changes
were introduced which included more religious instruction, mandatory teaching
of Arabic in secondary schools, dropping of English at primary school level and
the teaching of a heavily biased history of Islam and the Islamic Revolution. In
short, a large dose of Islamic ideology was injected into school and university
curricula. Thirdly, in addition to the ideological content of education, the
Islamic structure of the educational system was of great interest to the Islamic
state.
Id.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at 315.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

115.

Id.

116.

Id. at 316.
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conference committee assigned to making recommendations on
education noted that "[o]ne of the contrasts between the Islamic and
Western schooling system is that the latter trains boys and girls in
the same way, but the Islamic system is conscious of male-female
differences while considering them equal in creation."11 7
The
committee's report included recommending different curricula and
textbooks for boys and girls. 118 The Ministry of Education established
technical schools for girls in rural areas to teach carpet weaving and
beekeeping, activities considered by the State to be gender
appropriate while still offering a good income. 119 Girls were also
taught childcare, health, hygiene, and dressmaking. 120 Job fair
training taught boys subjects that focused on technology, industry,
artisan crafts, and trade; training for girls was focused on serviceoriented occupations. 12 1
The difficulty and confusion that the
Ministry of Education experienced in deciding what occupations were
to be deemed gender appropriate for women can be seen in their
refusal to encourage girls to pursue secretarial careers, made because
of the Ministry's fear that women would merely be thought of as sex
objects in these roles. 122 Although the Islamic Republic confronted
enormous difficulties in this process, there were also successes,
including increasing the literacy rate among women between 1976
and 1986 from 55.1% among urban women to 65.2%, and from 16.5%
123
to 36% among rural and nomadic women.
As for higher education, women were allowed to enter
universities; however, the subject areas that women could study were
circumscribed, with 54% of available subjects being closed to
women. 124 For example, women were barred from all technical,
engineering, and experimental sciences, while men were barred from
only three areas of study in total: midwifery, family hygiene, and
sewing. 12 5 Also, some areas that women were allowed to enter, such
as medical, environmental, and human sciences, held quotas of 20%
126
to 50%, limiting the number of women that could enter these fields.
In order to study abroad, women were required to be married, needed
the permission of their husband, and their husband had to stay with
them while abroad; male students did not have any of the same
restrictions. 1 27 Higher education was available to women, but their

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id. at

316-17.
317.
319.
1
320.
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options were limited by the State's determination of what is genderappropriate work for women.
The intersection of the constitutional role of women in the
Islamic Republic and employment law emerged as an arena of
conflicting pressures created by divergent ideological, political, and
economic forces. 128 Following the Revolution, some of the earliest
employment law reforms were aimed at segregating women in the
public sphere, including prohibitions on women serving as judges and
a requirement to wear the hejab in the workplace. 129 In 1987, the
Labor Law was amended to include a series of clauses with which the
State aimed to address issues of women's health and safety in the
Islamic Republic. 13 0
Specifically, Article 75 prohibited women
employees from carrying heavy weights or undertaking dangerous
work. 131 Article 76 prohibited women from taking night shifts,
excepting educational, health and medical work. 132
Article 77
mandated maternity leave in all employment that was to be 90 days,
half of which was to be taken after the birth of the child. 13 3 Article 79
required employers to give a mother one-half hour leave every three
hours to feed her baby, and to provide appropriate nurseries for preschool children despite the regime's condemnations of the Pahlavi
13 4
dynasty's implementation of a similar program.
Although the State preferred to exclude women from the public
sphere of employment in favor of domestic childcare, the Islamic
Republic's policy of gender segregation necessitated the presence of
women in the workplace. 135 A major determinant of women being
permitted to continue to work and study was that in a segregated
society "there was a dire need for more women teachers, doctors,
nurses, midwives, social workers and so on. ' 13 6 Simply stated, if Ali
Sharati 137 and Khomeini's vision of an effective functioning Islamic
128.
Id. at 324-25. The State was interested in maintaining male supremacy
and upholding the importance of rearing children; both of which they viewed as being
threatened by the Western understanding of gender equity. See id. at 322-23. On
economic front, the Islamic Republic confronted severe economic difficulties caused by
decreased foreign trade and a sluggish domestic economy that complicated
determinations on the role of women in the workplace. See id. at 323. Iran, however,
also confronted the reality that its young men were fighting a War with Iraq that was
cutting many lives short and as such reducing the available labor supply just when the
War effort needed these workers the most. Id. at 324.
129.
Id. at 325-26.
130.
Id. at 327.
131.
Id.
132.

Id.

133.
Id.
134.
Id.
135.
Id. at 322-25.
136.
Id. at 324-25.
137.
Darrow, supra note 75, at 310, 311-12, 314, 316. (noting that Sharati was
"the leading radical religious ideologue of the Iranian Revolution"). Darrow indicates
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gender segregated society was to be realized, then; for example, there
would have to be female doctors to treat female patients.
3. Democratic Elements in the Iranian Constitution
Although the clerical elites effectively dominated Iranian
politics, resulting in the implementation of anti-modernist policies
such as gender segregation, theocracy was not the only political
impulse appearing on the Iranian political stage. Islamic legalists
maintain that all governing decisions can be directed through
interpretations of religious texts; nevertheless, democratic and a
variety of modernist political philosophies appear scattered
throughout the Constitution. For example, the framers of the
Constitution "made an effort to emphasize that [the Constitution] was
an expression of the will; i.e. the ideals, of the Iranian people. '' 138 The
Constitution defines the Islamist view of government as one that
does not derive from the interests of a certain class, nor does it serve
the domination of an individual or a group. It represents . . . the
crystallization of the political ideal of a people who bear a common faith
and common outlook, taking an organized form in order to aid the
process of intellectual and ideological evolution toward the final goal,
139
i.e., movement toward God.

Although not defining the people "according to the democratic norms
of pluralism but rather as a homogenous community of like minded
individuals, this view of their will is still in contradiction with the
concept of velayat-e faqih," rule by the jurist. 14° Under the velayat-e
faqih model, "political power emanates from God alone and is
transferred from God to the Islamic jurists. It therefore in no way
depends upon the voice of the people for its legitimization. ''141 This
contradiction between the authority of the faqih and the rights of the
people also arises in Article 56 of the Constitution, providing that
[aibsolute sovereignty over the world and man belongs to God and it is
He Who has placed man in charge of his social destiny. No one can
deprive man of this God-given right, nor subordinate it to the interests
of a given individual or group. The people exercise this God-given right

that Ali Sharati's philosophy advanced the concept that women "can be an actor in a
civil society" and that in "both the family and civil society [women] can be a crucial
participant in the revolutionary struggle," but that because of a perception of women's
"vulnerability to empty fads in a consumerist society," there is "a need to construct
special protections for and walls around [women]," which is the concept that provided
the basis for the Islamist gender segregation model of society. Id.; see also generally
ROY MOTTAHEDEH, THE MANTLE OF THE PROPHET: RELIGION AND POLITICS IN IRAN 16,

330-31, 335, 353 (1985); ESPOSITO, supra note 6, at 177-79, 194, 199, 211.
138.
Algar, supra note 54, at 18.
139.
Id. at 18.
140.
SCHIRAZI, supra note 2, at 14.
141.
Id.
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Article 56 specifically indicates that God gave the right to "man [to
be] in charge of his social destiny"; this "God given right" is to be
"exercised" by "the people," not by a clerical jurist. 143
Further reliance on the will of the people for justification of the
Islamic Republic appears in Article 1 of the Constitution, which
indicates that Islamic Republic is a form of government that "received
an affirmative vote from the Iranian people on the basis of their
longstanding belief in the Quranic government of truth and
justice ....-"144 Furthermore, Article 6 recognizes the right of the
people to guide the State:
In the Islamic Republic of Iran, the affairs of the country must be
administered on the basis of public opinion expressed by means of
elections, including the election of the President of the Republic, the
representatives of the National Consultative Assembly, the members of
councils, or by means of referenda in matters specified in other articles
of this Constitution. 145

Although its power is severely curtailed by the authority of the
Council of Guardians and the faqih, the elected parliament controls
certain levers of influence that render it a reduced, but still
146
important, institution in the government.
Although the Constitution guarantees fundamental rights only
where they are not contradictory with Islam as interpreted by the
Islamists, "the mere fact that the constitution mentions fundamental
rights may be seen as a concession to those forces who demanded
such rights and had participated in the revolution for the sake of
obtaining them. ' 14 7 In a section of the Iranian Constitution entitled
"The Rights of the People," the enumerated rights include, to name a
few: equal rights regardless of ethnic group or tribe, color, race, or
language; equal enjoyment of protection of the law for men and
women; protection of a person's rights to dignity, life, property,
dwelling, and to practice an occupation; a ban on interrogation
concerning opinions; a ban on punishment based on belief; a free
press; the right to an attorney; presumption of innocence in a court of
law for defendants; a ban on torture; and the right of all citizens to

142.
IRAN CONST. art. 56 (emphasis added).
143.
Id.
144.
Id. art. 1.
145.
Id. art. 6.
146.
SCHIRAZI, supra note 2, at 15-16. See also FARIBA ADELKHAH, BEING
MODERN IN IRAN 79 (2000) ("In the Islamic Republic, elections are more important than
is too often supposed because the Assembly (Majles) is not without power under the
1979 Constitution.").
147.
SCHIRAZI, supra note 2, at 17.
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access a court of law. 148 The free press provision of the Iranian
Constitution is demonstrative of the tensions inherent in these rights
between a democratic impulse and the Islamist endeavor to create
and maintain a virtuous Islamic society: "Publications and the press
to
are free to present all matters except those that are detrimental
1 49
the fundamental principles of Islam and the rights of the public."'
Although the Iranian Revolution's system of law is based on
the concept that
the shari'a,because of its relation to the divine source of knowledge and
its perfection, is endowed with universality and possesses the vitality to
solve all humankind's social and personal problems in every time and
place[,] . . . the Constitution [has, nevertheless, imported] important
elements which have been borrowed ... from Western secular sources
1 50
and stand out as concepts that are alien to the shari'a.

The concept of a Constitution itself is "first and foremost among
Also, the three branches of government "with
these.' 151
corresponding institutions, the division of each of these institutions
into different councils, government offices and organizations, the
rules regulating relations between these bodies as well as the clauses
to the
in the constitution allocating economic rights and the functions
52
state,... had to be borrowed.., from foreign models.'
4. Marxist Economic Thought and Environmentalism in the Iranian
Constitution
The Iranian Revolution not only fundamentally redefined social
and political relations, but also dramatically altered the nation's
political economy, pushing the country away from the capitalist
impulses of the Pahlavi dynasty. 153 The educational and legal
reforms instituted by Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi under the
White Revolution, 154 a program aimed at modernizing Iran by the

148.

IRAN CONST. arts. 19-42.

149.
Id. art. 24.
SCHIRAZI, supra note 2, at 17-18.
150.
151.
Id. at 18.
Id.
152.
MOTTAHEDEH, supra note 137, at 331. The capitalist reforms in the Iranian
153.
economy under the Pahlavi dynasty resulted in almost dizzying economic growth in the
early 1970s. Id. The Iranian economy was growing at a rate of approximately ten
percent per year, with the income from oil revenues increasing throughout the decade
until the revolution from $1.1 billion in 1970 to $2.4 billion in 1972 to $17.4 billion in
1974. Id. Even the traditional Iranian open air markets (bizarres) experienced
economic advancement during the decade of 1970s. Id.
Algar, supra note 54, at 14-15. The White Revolution is referred to in the
154.
Iranian Constitution's Preamble as "the American conspiracy" and "a step intended to
strengthen the bases of despotic government and reinforce the political, cultural, and
" Id. at 14.
economic dependence of Iran on world imperialism ....
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21st century, 155 disproportionately benefited an extremely Small
group of urban elites. 156 The Iranian Revolution brought even more
severe shocks to the economy as relations with the United States and
Europe became strained, war with Iraq ensued, and the underlying
157
economic theories of governance and laws of property were altered.
In the Introduction to the Iranian Constitution entitled "The
Economy is a Means, Not an End," the Marxist interventionist
economic theory of many of the revolutionary elite 58 is set forth:
In strengthening the foundations of the economy, the fundamental
consideration will be satisfying the material needs of man in the course
of his overall growth and development. This principle contrasts with
other economic systems, where the aim is the concentration and
accumulation of wealth and the maximization of profit. In materialist
schools of thought, the economy represents an end in itself, so that it
comes to be a subversive and corrupting factor in the course of man's
development. In Islam, the economy is a means, intended only to
contribute to the attainment of the ultimate goal.
The economic program of Islam consists, then, of providing the means
needed for the emergence of the various creative capacities of man. It
is the duty.of the Islamic government to furnish all citizens with equal
and suitable opportunities, to provide them with work, and to satisfy
their essential needs, so that the course of their progress may be
assured. 159

Upon seizing power, the revolutionaries employed their economic and
philosophical understanding to fundamentally alter existing property
law in Iran: "Laws were passed to control prices and markets; to
nationalize many industries, banks, and foreign trade; to expropriate
urban land for use by the poor and homeless; and to undertake a

155.
JOHN L. ESPOSITO, ISLAMIc THREAT: MYTH OR REALITY 101 (1995). See also
MOTTAHEDEH, supra note 137, at 331.
The Iranian government saw itself in a new light. The government would
make Iran the Switzerland or, more exactly, the United States of the Third
World, for, once its oil ran out, Iran would have an infrastructure of roads,
education, even nuclear power plants that would be unmatched elsewhere in
the Third World.
Alongside this infrastructure it would have a highly
educated, technologically experienced population that would be able to export
technology to the Third World more cheaply than Japan or the West. Of the
oil-rich countries, only Iran, with a population of about thirty-five million
would be both populous enough and rich enough to recreate its future this way.
MOTTAHEDEH, supra note 137, at 331.
156.
ESPOSITO, supra note 155, at 103.
157.
Bijan Khajehpour, Iran's Economy: Twenty Years After the Islamic
Revolution, in IRAN AT THE CROSSROADS 94-111 (John L. Esposito & R.K. Ramazani
eds., 2001).
158.
BRUMBERG, supra note 54, at 62, 67-69, 71 (explaining the development of
the Islamic left, its influence on the revolution, and how it was influenced by Marxist
thought).
159. Algar, supra note 54, at 21.
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major redistribution of agricultural lands.

'16 0

The initial "mass

nationalization of industries and economic entities, .

.

. [occurred]

under the name of the 'confiscation of assets of the Royal family and
its affiliates,' but later clearly derived from the revolution's economic
The nationalization of industry placed a
",161
philosophy.
significant percentage of Iran's economy directly or via "revolutionary
foundations" under State control with estimates ranging from sixty
percent to eighty percent of the economy being subject to the direction
62

of clerical elites.1
The restructuring of the economy was not haphazard; rather, the
revolutionaries' view of the appropriate economic system is set forth
163
in Chapter IV of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Article 44 envisions a three-sector economy, with varying levels of
State control depending on the size of the enterprise:
The economic system of the Islamic Republic of Iran is to consist of
three sectors: state, cooperative, and private, and is to be based on
orderly and correct planning.
The state sector is to include all large-scale and major industries,
foreign trade, major mineral resources, banking, insurance, energy,
dams and large-scale irrigation networks, radio and television, post,
telegraphic and telephonic services, aviation, shipping, roads, railroads
and the like; all these will be publicly owned and administered by the
state.
The cooperative sector is to include cooperative companies and
institutions concerned with production and distribution, established in
both the cities and countryside, in accordance with Islamic criteria.
The private sector consists of those activities concerned with
agriculture, animal husbandry, industry, trade, and services that
supplement the activities of the state and cooperative sectors.
Ownership in each of these sectors is protected by the laws of the
Islamic Republic, to the extent permitted by the. other articles of this
chapter, and on condition that such ownership does not go beyond the
bounds of Islamic law, that it contributes to the economic growth and
progress of the country, and that it does not harm society. The [precise]
scope of each of the three sectors, as well as regulations and conditions
16 4
governing their operation, 'will be specified by law.

Despite the theoretical existence of three separate sectors, the
practical reality is that the Government has acted to limit the private
5
sector to only the smallest economic enterprises. 16 Additionally, the
implications of these property laws on capital investors both inside
and outside of Iran include fear that the government acting pursuant
to Article 44 could seize almost any industrial, manufacturing,
agricultural, or commercial enterprise; therefore, capital investors

160.
161.
162.

ESPOSITO, supra note 155, at 115.
Khajehpour, supra note 157, at 94.
Id.

163.

IRAN CONST. ch. IV.

164.
165.

Id. art. 44.
Khajehpour, supra note 157, at 94.
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kept their money out of Iran, retarding the economic development of
166
the nation.
Although Iran was a self-sufficient agricultural nation
throughout its history, under Reza Shah the country's land laws,
which previously allowed for customary grazing on unenclosed
agricultural lands, were ended, creating enormous difficulties for
small farmers that historically were dependant on this right of land
use. 167 The Iranian revolutionaries not only attempted redistribution
projects aimed at breaking up the large estates that were responsible
for the end of the grazing practices, they also conducted massive
seizures of property pursuant to Article 45 of the Constitution:
Public wealth and property, such as uncultivated or abandoned land,
minerals, seas, lakes, rivers and other public bodies of water,
mountains, valleys, forests, marshland, natural forests, unenclosed
pastureland, legacies without heirs, property of undetermined
ownership, and public property removed from usurpers, shall be at the
disposal of the Islamic government for it to use in accordance with the
public interest.168

The natural world made another significant appearance in the
Iranian
Constitution
in
Article
50,
which
introduced
environmentalism into constitutional law by explicitly forbidding
development that threatened the environment:
The preservation of the environment in which present and future
generations are charged with the construction of a progressive society is
regarded as a public duty in the Islamic Republic. Economic and other
activities that tend consistently to pollute the environment or inflict
16 9
irreparable damage on it are therefore forbidden.

Environmentalism and state control in what was historically a
highly capitalistic society that maintained a complex free-enterprise
system are two examples of elements of the Iranian Constitution that
are not part of traditional shariathat, nevertheless, play a significant
role in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic. 170 The various
competing and overlapping philosophical foundations that were
incorporated into Iran's Constitution helped lay the foundation for
the political battleground over the identity and control of the Islamist
movement that began to occur as the death of Khomeini became
imminent.

166.
Id. at 94-95, 104-08, 119-20. Article 81 of the Iranian Constitution provides
an additional strong disincentive to capital investment in Iran from foreign investors.
Id. at 95. The Article declares "[t]he granting of concessions to foreign individuals and
companies is prohibited." Id. at 95.
167.
Id. at 95.
168.
IRAN CONST. art. 45.
169.
Id. art. 50.
170.

Id. arts. 44, 45, 50.
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B. Contemporary Iran
1. Attempts to Reinvigorate the Power of the Conservatives Beyond
Khomeini
In 1989, the Reconsideration Council, composed primarily of

171
Khomeini's supporters, was aware that his health was fading.
Concerned also about the status of the faqih and the succession
beyond Khomeini, the Reconsideration Council began to try to
strengthen the conservative position and the faqih as an
institution. 172 The newly-reformed position of faqih witnessed an
awkward alteration with reduced qualifications and increased
powers. 173 Under Article 109 of the Amended Constitution of 1989,
the leader no longer needed to "be a marja (a source of imitation with
considerable following who renders independent judgement over a
variety of issues) or enjoy the support of the majority" of the people of

Shevlin, supra note 31, at 378-79 (noting that Khomeini passed away in the
171.
summer of 1989).
See generally id. at 376-77.
172.
The continuity of Government initially appeared to be ensured by the
designation of Ayatollah Montazeri as Khomeini's eventual successor.
Montazeri[,] ... a member of the dissident clergy, however, who, like Ayatollah
Sahri'atmadari, believed that the Faqih should not be a single all-powerful
leader but, rather, one who, "in making important decisions ... consults with
experts and the learned to ensure that his decisions are beneficial to society as
a whole and do not incur irreparable damage to the social fabric of Muslim
nations." He also charged that the government had been guilty of "injustice
[and] denial of people's rights."
Montazeri's criticisms of the regime were seized upon by President Ali
Khamenei and Speaker of the House Hashemi Rafsanjani, "both favorite
disciples of the Faqih, [who] felt themselves vulnerable should Montazeri come
to power." Both realized Montazeri was more learned than they were, and if it
was "knowledge of Islamic law that was to determine who was to run the
Both were, therefore, influential in
country" both "had much to lose."
convincing Khomeini to dismiss Montazeri. Even after Montazeri was removed
as a threat, however, succession problems remained. According to Article 107
of the constitution, should a suitable candidate not be found to replace
Khomeini, a "council of three or five religious leaders would take charge of the
leadership." The problem for Khamenei and Rafsanjani was that membership
in such a group would consist of the "leading ulama [(religious clerics)] selected
on the basis of knowledge and learning, [and] would [therefore] not have
included either."
Id. at 375-76. As a result, both men encouraged Khomeini to revise the succession
provisions of the Constitution. Id. at 376. "There was also a need to clarify the power
structure in Iran and delineate the powers of the President. This need, combined with
the campaign to revise the criterion for determining a successor, compelled Khomeini
to order, on April, 25, 1989, the creation of a twenty member 'Council of
Reconsideration to revise the Constitution."' Id.
Id. at 376; see also IRAN CONST. art. 109 (amended 1989).
173.
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Iran. 174 Under the Amended Constitution, the leader still needed to
"be well-informed about feqh (Islamic jurisprudence), about sociopolitical problems, . . . and must be 'just and pious.""1 75 While the
reductions in the qualifications necessary to achieve the mantle of
leadership were being written into the Constitution, the
Reconsideration Council was simultaneously increasing the
institutional powers of the faqih 76 beyond even what Khomeini
possessed under the Constitution. 1 77 The Supreme Leader was given
the authority under Article 110 of the Amended Constitution to set
the "general policies of the Islamic Republic" in conjunction with the
Council of Determination of the Interests of the Republic.17 8 This
Council did not function as a limitation on the faqih's power because,
acting pursuant to Article 112 of the Amended Constitution, the
Supreme Leader "will single-handedly determine the composition of
this new council."'1 79 Essentially, under the Amended Constitution of
1989, the only institutional limitation on the faqih is that his policies
80
agree with those he selects to be on the Council of Determination.1
Other new powers granted to the faqih are the ability to "order
referenda, delegate some of his duties and responsibilities to others,
and decide when to revise the Constitution," to dismiss members of
the Council of the Guardians, and to reconvene the Reconsideration
Council to make any necessary constitutional modifications or
revisions.18 1
Following the death of Khomeini in 1988, Rafsanjani emerged as
President, and Khamanei as the faqih.'8 2 Rafsanjani, in opposition to
the Islamic left that had called for and achieved the nationalization of
important economic outlets after the revolution, instituted a reform

174.

IRAN CONST.art. 109 (amended 1989).

175.

Id. art. 107. See also ESPOSITO, supra note 6, at 78.

[B] ecause the Quran does not provide an exhaustive body of laws, the desire 1.o
discover and delineate Islamic law in a comprehensive and consistent fashion
led to the development of the science of law, or jurisprudence (fiqh [(or feqh)]).
Fiqh, "understanding," is that science or discipline that sought to ascertain,
interpret, and apply God's will or guidance (Sharia) as found in the Quran to all
aspects of life.
Id.

176.
Mohsen Milani, Shiism and the State in the Constitution of the Islamic
Republic of Iran, in IRAN: POLITICAL CULTURE IN THE IsLAMIc REPUBLIC 141 (Samih K.
Farsoun & Mehrdad Mahsayekhi eds., 1992) (postulating that the lesser religious
credentials might undermine the support for the faqih in the public, therefore
necessitating greater institutional control).
177.
Id.
178.
IRAN CONST. art. 110 (amended 1989).
179.
Id. art. 112.
180.
Id. arts. 110, 112.
181.
Milani, supra note 176, at 151-53.
182.
Milani, supra note 9, at 32.

1710

VANDERBILTIOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 35.1679

program directed at social and economic reform, along with a more
Rafsanjani's program of "economic
moderated foreign policy.183
reconstruction" was directed at reversing the economic agenda of the
Islamic left, which had socialized much of the Iranian economy in the
Nevertheless, the reforms
years following the revolution.18 4
instituted by Rafsanjani, a conservative closely tied with the clerical
elites, were only a small precursor of the more turbulent political
debates that would arise in the 1990s with the increased prominence
of Mohammad Khatami.
2. The Election of Khatami
During the 1997 presidential campaign, President Mohammad
Khatami 8 5 challenged the traditionalist leadership and offered a new
vision of Islamism:
I have made a covenant with the nation to move with it towards justice
.... They try to say religion and freedom do not mix .... They are
striving to say that security and freedom do not mix and that in order
to have security, freedom must be crushed. But the nation will not be
fooled.186

During the campaign, Khatami's "mantra was political developmentstrengthening civil society, respecting the rule of law, cherishing
freedom, and institutionalizing tolerance-all of which, in the
convoluted vernacular of revolutionary Iran, meant democracy." 187 As
President, Khatami became the personification of the reform
movement; his objectives included empowering the people through
popular sovereignty and making the Republic "gentler, kinder, and
Consequently, the central
more tolerant and transparent.' 18 8
argument between conservatives and reformers in the election of
1997 was transformed into a dispute over the role of democracy and

183.
Id. at 32-33.
184.
Id.
185.
Id. at 29-30 (noting that even though Khamati is a reformer, he is
considered to be "a committed cleric with impeccable loyalty to the Islamic Republic").
186.
Id. at 29 (quoting President Mohammad Khatami, in Hamadan, Iran, July
27, 1999).
187.
Id. at 30.
Id. It should be noted that this view of Khatami as the champion of the
188.
reform movement is not universal. Reza Pahlavi, the son of the deposed Shah and the
REZA
would-be heir to the throne of the Pahlavi dynasty, holds a different view.
PAHLAVI, WINDS OF CHANGE: THE FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY IN IRAN 39-40 (2002).
Pahlavi does acknowledge that Khatami's "election was a step in the right direction"
and agrees that Khatami is "clearly more liberal than earlier leaders, and [that he]
brought more popular voices into what had been a totally closed system." Id.
Nevertheless, Pahlavi states that Khatami's "changes were only meant to improve the
system of clerical rule cosmetically, not revamp the entire clerical order" and that "Mr.
Khatami's ultimate goal has always been to preserve the system not to change it." Id.
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popular sovereignty within the Islamic Republic. 8 9
Unlike Schirazi, who conceives of democracy as a reality external
to the Islamic cosmology, 190 Mohsen Milani, another scholar on Iran,
argues that the election "was a debate of Islam against Islam."'191
Milani argues that "[i]n one Islam, popular sovereignty and the
velayat-i faqih must become compatible and complimentary, and in
the other, the faqih speaks the last word and limited popular
sovereignty can be exercised only within the boundaries he
defines."'1 92 Further explaining the dichotomy, Milani indicates that
"[o]ne Islam attempts to embrace modern ideas; the other is confident
that its divine regulations transcend time and space.' 9 3 In the
1990s, the transcendence of these regulations was being challenged
by a myriad of adversaries including not only Khatami, but also
women's groups.
3. The Women's Rights Movement
The women's rights reform movement can be cited as support
both for the Milani argument that a democratic impulse can be found
in Islam itself, and Schirazi's contention that the democratic impulse
is derived from external factors. Supporting Milani's democracy as
internal to Islam argument, the women's rights movement's primary
contention is not that Islamic law does not adequately protect or
safeguard women's rights; rather, the argument is that the existing
"law and its implementors often fail to give women their due rights"
as required by God's law. 194
This argument utilizes existing
interpretive guides that are considered to be "more women-friendly"
to argue the point that women actually have greater rights under
shariathan what is currently being afforded to them by the State. 195
Some reformists, however, are engaging in interpretation of sacred
texts themselves, arguing that the door of ijtihad, i.e., "independent
96
should be reopened. 197
analysis or interpretation of Islamic law,'
This reinterpretation frequently includes the "reformist method of
contextualizing and histoicizing Quranic verses."' 198
That a number of reformers argue "that such revisions [in the
role of women] should be carried out in light of 'contemporary schools

189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Milani, supra note 9, at 30.
SCHIRAZI, supra note 2, at 1-2.
Milani, supra note 9, at 30.
Id.
Id.

194.

PAIDAR, supra note 82, at 275.

195.
196.
197.
198.

Najmabadi, supra note 73, at 65.
ESPOSITO, supra note 6, at 254.
Najmabadi, supra note 73, at 65.
Id. at 69.
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of philosophy and thought,"' supports Schirazi's contention. 19 9 These
critiques are largely based on policy arguments regarding the wellbeing of women as individuals and society in general, and are often
based on the writings of Western feminists, particularly more
traditional feminist writers such as Virginia Woolf200 and Simone de
Beauvoir, 20 1 and secular Iranian feminists such as the poet Furugh
20 2
Farrukhzad.
Regardless of whether its influences are internal or external to3
20
Islam, the Iranian women's movement has achieved some success.
Critics could argue, however, that its success is mainly limited to the
Nevertheless, the government allowing
pages of journals. 20 4
publications such as Zan Ruz and Zanan to present dissenting views
such as the highly controversial but, nevertheless, published article
"Rehabilitating Eve," is a mark of considerable progress for women's
rights and free speech in the Islamic Republic. 20 5 Whereas Zanan
tends to address issues on a more abstract level, Zan Ruz focuses on
Id. at 66.
199.
Id. at 72, 74. Of her various writings, Virginia Woolf's text, A Room of
200.
One's Own, has been of particular interest to the Iranian feminist movement. Id.; see
generally VIRGINIA WOOLF, A ROOM OF ONE'S OWN (Mary Gordon ed. 1990).
See generally SIMONE DE BEAUVIOR, THE WOMAN DESTROYED 181-82
201.
(Patrick O'Brian trans. 1969). The concept of a subordinated woman's self-image being
dictated by the view of her male companion, Beauvoir's heroine states:
When I am with Maurice I cannot prevent myself from feeling I am in front of a
judge. He thinks things about me that he does not tell me: it makes my head
swim. I used to see myself clearly through his eyes-too flattering a picture,
perhaps, but one in which I recognized myself. Now I ask myself, Whom does
he see? Does he think me mean-minded, jealous, blabbing and even disloyal
because I make inquiries beyond his back?
Id.
202.
critics as

Najmabadi, supra note 73, at 72. Farrukhzad has been described by her

the corrupt poetess, who participated in pleasure seeking parties of the taghuti
times (the devilish time of the old regime). Her naked (meaning "immodestly"
dressed) pictures were portrayed in the press of those times. Her corrupt and
sexual poetry is a condensation of inner collapse, filth, and forbidden thoughts
that turn away any chaste and authentic woman.
Id. at 73 (citing Asadallah Badmchaian, Bidun-i sharh, ZANAN, Aug.-Sept. 1994, at 9.
Interestingly, Zanan published this critique of Farrukhzad as well as other opinions
that run contrary to the thrust of the publication, which is primarily sympathetic with
the feminist reform movement. One of Farrukhzad's most influential and widely-read
pieces of poetry, Another Birth, written in 1963 shortly before her death in an auto
accident, is "a celebration of 'the birth of a female character who rejoices in her new
options, a warrior who has fought for every step in her path to freedom. She becomes
her own model and gives birth to a self in the image of her own liking and aspirations.
Her rebirth is indeed a self-birth."' Id. at 74 (citing MOHSEN M. MILANI, VEILS AND
WORDS 135 (1992)).
Id. at 59-77.
203.
Id.
204.
205.
PAIDAR, supra note 82, at 311.
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creating a voice for women in the public sphere by presenting
women's complaints on issues that are of considerable practical
importance, including: violent husbands and other familial hardships,
in the
inflation, food shortages, housing shortages, discrimination
206
schooling.
and
health
children's
of
issues
and
workplace,
The women's reform movement has experienced gains beyond
increased freedom of expression. For example, Clause 1169 of the
pre-Revolutionary Civil Code was declared legitimate by the State
despite opposition from some religious clerics. As a result, women
whose spouses die can receive foster parent status that allows them
to raise their children, though they still are not allowed to officially
gain custody if another male guardian is available such as a
grandfather or uncle.2 0 7 In 1989, restrictions on women's entry into
study in the fields of geology and agriculture were lifted, entry quotas
were abolished in medical, para-medical, and some engineering fields,
and quotas for women in some technical and industrial subjects were
The changes, however, in some areas have been
expanded. 20°
minuscule. For example, the Islamic Republic continues to sharply
curtail the rights of unmarried non-widows, who are viewed as
inexplicable persons by the Islamist movement.20 9 The progress of
the women's rights movement in Iran has been slow, but it is
developing.
4. The Philosophy of Democratic Islamism
The fundamental dispute, however, between the Islamists in
Iran is not over a particular legal issue or policy, even one as
important as the societal role of women; rather, the basic dispute
among the Islamists is about the nature of law itself. Abdolkarim
Soroush, 210 a leading intellectual of the reform movement and critic

206.
Id.
Id. at 297.
207.
Id. at 320.
208.
209.
Id. at 297-98, 302.
Valla Vakili, Abdolkarim Soroush and Critical Discourse in Iran, in
210.
MAKERS OF CONTEMPORARY ISLAM 150, 150 (John L. Esposito & John 0. Voll eds.,
2001). Soroush in the late 1980s and early 1990s "emerged... as the foremost Iranian
intellectual operating within the terms of religious discourse." Id. at 150. His political
writings on the role of religion in the State "combine a deep knowledge of Islam with a
subtle mastery of Persian poetry, creating an individual style that has appealed
strongly to many religiously inclined Iranian university students." Id. Soroush has
been criticized strongly by "the Iranian clergy and from more militant-minded Islamic
His ability to converse in "the dominant religious language of
student groups." Id.
political discourse in Iran" and "to move fluently and innovatively within a domain
traditionally dominated by an exclusivist clerical establishment has rendered him a
His standing
Id.
more dangerous critic than many of his contemporaries."
domestically is bolstered by his established credentials from the Revolution including
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of the clerical regime since the late 1980s, has presented arguments
2 11
for reform that have been extremely persuasive to many Iranians.
Soroush argues that "religiously derived methods of governance are
insufficient for administering a modern state[,] . . . rejects . . . any
government that claims legitimacy based on the implementation of
some notion of Islamic methods of governance[, and] . . . considers a
democratic government the only kind compatible with his notion of
Islam . . . . [Ilt is not only compatible but essential with [his]
212
notion."
The break between the reformists and the clerical regime is a
split on the nature of law, religion, ideology, and the divine itself.
Both sides accept the immutability of religion. 213 However, unlike
the Islamists of the clerical regime, Soroush, who is also an Islamist
theorist, argues that the endeavor of Islamism should not be to
reconstruct classical Islam in a new era. 214 Rather, Soroush asserts
that "to meet the challenges of modernity Muslims should seek not to
change their religion but rather to reconcile their understanding of
religion with changes in the outside world. '215 In order to achieve
this reconciliation, one must accept the inevitably of changing human
216
understandings of religion.
Theoretically, some clerical scholars might be prepared to accept
this notion; however, the application of this concept to reach the
conclusion that human religious knowledge is no better, and probably
worse, than the understanding of math, science, literature, or any
other subject creates an enormous gap between the Islamists of the
217
reform movement and those that compose the clerical regime.
Soroush argues that religious knowledge is only one branch of
understanding, and that it "is not divine by virtue of its divine subject

association with Ali Shariati and Murteza Mutaharri and appointment by Ayatollah
Khomeini to the Advisory Council of the Cultural Revolution. Id.
Id. at 151.
211.
Soroush proved more capable than other critics at negotiating the ambiguities,
uncertainties, and restrictions of [public discourse]. His thorough knowledge of
the terms of religious discourse, dominance over the language of poetic
subtlety, and sensitivity to linguistic equivocation created an individual flair
for criticism within restricted space unmatched by his contemporaries.
Soroush could speak the unspeakable without ever actually saying it.

Id.
Id. at 155.
212.
Id. at 153.
213.
Id.
214.
Id. Soroush views Islam the religion as unchanging. He, however, argues
215.
that any attempt to reconstruct a past form of societal understanding of Islam is
incapable of achieving success. Id. He argues that the human understanding of
religion must be changed in order to provide "the key to reconciling a fixed religion
with a dynamic world." Id.
Id.
216.
See generally id. at 153-54.
217.
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matter," which leads to his critique that religious knowledge "should
not be confused with religion itself.12 18 The implications of this
argument for the interpretations of sacred texts, which in Shiite
Islam include the Quran, the hadiths, and the teachings of the Shii
imams, is that these interpretations will vary depending upon the
methodology employed and the scholar's cosmology, world-view,
which is itself bound by a variety of circumstances including societal
background and the historical period. 219 Soroush, however, does not
embrace the relativist assertion that all understandings are equal; to
the contrary, he argues that there are better understandings of the
truth.220 The divide that exists between the Islamists allied with
Soroush and those tied to the clerical regime is over who should
arbitrate between the interpretations.
Soroush argues that
knowledge is public, and that all new knowledge or developments in
thought occur within the context of the entire body of public
knowledge. 221
Consequently, religious knowledge or scholars'
interpretations should be evaluated for correctness by the broader
public community, rather than by experts such as the Council of
222
Guardians or even the faqih.
Soroush's critique of efforts to mold Islam into a static religious
ideology 223 are of even greater concern when applied to an ideological

218.

Id.

219.

Id. at 154; see generally FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL:

PRELUDE TO A PHILOSOPHY OF THE FUTURE § 6 (Marion Faber trans., 1998). Nietzsche
states:
Little by little I came to understand what every great philosophy to date has
been: the personal confession of its author, a kind of unintended and unwitting
memoir; and similarly, that the moral (or immoral) aims in every philosophy
constituted the actual seed from which the whole plant invariably grew.
Whenever explaining how a philosopher's most far-fetched metaphysical
propositions have come about, in fact, one always does well (and wisely) to ask
first: "What morality is it (is he) aiming at?" Thus I do not believe that an
"instinct for knowledge" is the father of philosophy, but rather that here as
elsewhere a different instinct has merely made use of knowledge (and
kNOwledge) as its tool. For anyone who scrutinizes the basic human instincts
to determine how influential they have been as inspiring spirts (or demons and
goblins) will find that all the instincts have practiced philosophy, and that each
one of them would like only to well to represent itself as the ultimate aim of
existence and as the legitimate master of all other instincts. For every instinct
is tyrannical; and as such seeks to philosophize.
Id.
220.
221.
222.
223.

Vakili, supra note 210, at 154-55.
Id. at 154.
Id.
Id. at 156.

The reason for this rejection lies in the characteristics of ideology and their
effect on religion. In situating itself in opposition to a particular rival, and
interpreting the world based on rivalry, religious ideology reduces the
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government, because its poses an additional threat to the
development of the nation, the individual religious experience, and
the body of religious knowledge. 22 4 According to Soroush,
an ideological government must both develop and maintain an official
ideological platform that at once legitimizes the government and acts as
an unifying and mobilizing force. To accomplish this, the government
requires an official class of government-allied ideologues, whose sole
225
task is the formation and defense of the ruling ideology.

When the government is ruled through religious ideology, this class of
ideologues is composed of government-allied interpreters of
religion. 226 Soroush argues that in such a system "religion becomes
the servant of the state, as it is transformed into a legitimizing
ideological base" that serves as the justification for actions of
rulers. 227
This type of state imposes a restrictive ideological
understanding that mandates intellectual conformity that, according
to the reformist movement, retards the growth of religious
knowledge 228 and restricts the continued development of the nation
due to the resulting lack of available flexibility in thought, reasoning,
and approaches to governance. 2 29 Soroush and the reformers with
complexity of religion to fixed ideological worldview. According to Soroush, it is
impossible to defend one understanding of Islam as definitive.
All
understandings change over time. But to transform religion into ideology is to
cast it in a definitive, unchanging mold. This replaces religion with an
ideological version of it, for the performance of religion is now ascribed to the
religious ideology.

Id.
224.
Id. at 155. Soroush's political critiques largely stem from his concern about
the current political apparatus in Iran placing significant political and social obstacles
in the way of the growth of religious knowledge.
225.
Id. at 157, 231 n.29. Ali Sharati, one the most important intellectual
thinkers of the Islamist movement, argued for the necessity of an official state ideology;
however, Sharati opposed the formation or even unofficial existence of a class of statesponsored religious interpreters. Id. at 156-57. Soroush argues that when read in the
context of his broader writings, Ali Sharati would have opposed state-sponsored
ideology if he had understood that it would become linked with the formation of the
class of religious interpreters that he opposed. See id.
226.
Id. at 157.
227.
Id.
228.
Id. Soroush argues that for religious knowledge to expand, it is necessary
to have conditions that allow for the acceptance of transformation and evolution in
religious understandings. In the type of ideological state created by the Islamic
Republic's ruling elite, the freedom necessary to interpret religious texts is restricted.
Consequently, "[bly forcibly imposing an ideological vulgarization of religion upon
society, state-allied ideologues do not only reduce individual freedom; they also
determine the acceptable standards and use of reason in religious inquiry, as any
rationality not based on the logic of the prevailing ideology is deemed unacceptable."
Id. Soroush contends that unobstructed reasoning is necessary to the growth of
religious knowledge like any other field of study, thus the restrictive ideological
standards of the regime pose a significant threat to the continuing development of
religious knowledge. Id.
229.
Id. (quoting Abdolkarim Soroush).
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him under Khatami's banner argue that Islamism as a movement is
broad enough to find a solution to the quest for an ideal society
through the formation of a religious society instead of an ideological
state. 23 0
The distinction between a religious society and an
ideological state is manifested both in the relationships between
Islam and religious government, and Islam and democracy, and in the
danger to religion and religious scholars presented by the existence of
23
a clerical establishment in government. '
The Reformist movement does not seek the separation of religion
and the state; rather, as Soroush writes, the movement concedes that
in their concept of a religious society politics inevitably take a
religious form. 23 2 This religious form is created as a result of
individuals expressing their religious beliefs in a political system that
is responsive to a religious populous. 23 3 The accountability of leaders
to public opinion results in the formation of a political system that,
despite not being derived from the interpretation of religious texts by
the elites, is nevertheless the just society sought by the Islamist
23 4
movement and an embodiment of Islamic religious sentiment.
Furthermore, the reformers contend that the clerical elites fail to
understand that "we do not draw our conception of justice from
religion, but we accept religion because it is just. ' 23 5 Khatami and
other reformers believe that human rights exist and have a source

In principle the possibility of the internal growth and development of a political
system exists only when the that system is flexible, and when the possibility for
new reasoning and change exists within the system, .. .and if this does not
exist, inevitably for reform, the foundation of the system must be inverted, and
upon the inversion, a new foundation built.

Id.
230.
Vakili, supra note 210, at 157-58. Soroush argues that there are profound
differences between an ideological society and a religious society.
In an ideological society, the government ideologizes the society, whereas in
religious societies, the society makes the government religious.
In an
ideological society, an official interpretation of ideology governs, but in a
religious society, there are prevailing interpretations but no official
interpretations. In an ideological society, the task of the formation of ideology
is relegated to the ideologues. In a religious society, however, the issue of
religion is too great for it to be relegated solely to the hands of the official
interpreters. In a religious society, no personality and no fatwa is beyond
criticism. And no understanding of religion is considered the final or most
complete understanding.
Id. at 157-58 (quoting Abdolkarim Soroush). A fatwa is a formal legal opinion or
decision of a mufti on a matter of Islamic law. ESPOSITO, supra note 6, at 253.
231.
Vakili, supra note 210, at 158-71.
232.
Id. at 158.
233.
Id. at 158-65.
234.
Id. at 158-60.
235.
Id. at 159.
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beyond religious text; they argue these rights are undermined when
236
religious text alone becomes the sole source of human rights.
Additionally, they assert that there are no religiously-proscribed
methods of governance and that any attempt to uncover these
methods through textual analysis is little more than a wasted effort
at best, and sophistry at worst. 237 Soroush argues that to rationally
administer a state in the modern era, more than religious text is
required; thus, modern government should additionally look to social
and natural sciences for guidance, with the methods employed not
necessarily needing to be derived from religious text in order to avoid
238
violating religious values.
The reformists contend that a democratic society based on
popular sovereignty not only corresponds with Islamic religious
values, but also is necessary to promote the development of a thriving
religious society. 239 They argue that the legitimacy of government is
derived not from its ruling according to its ideological understanding
of Islam; rather, its legitimacy is based on rule that is in
correspondence with the will of the public-including the people's
sense of religion. 240 Khatami addressed this point-an extremely
controversial position among elites in the Islamic Republic-in a book
published before his run for the presidency. 24 1 He argued "that
liberal democracy, despite all its shortcomings, is one of the West's
greatest achievements, and that its basic tenets must be warmly
embraced by all modern societies. '2 42 In the reformers' religious
society, commonly-held public understandings of religion, subject to
change over time, provide the boundaries for political action rather
than the more static religious ideology of the clerical regime. 24 3 They
contend that democracy encapsulates both values and methods of
governance that allow for the rationalization of politics through
public accountability promoted via separation of powers, a free and
independent press, free elections, freedom of assembly, freedom of
expression, permitting the existence of multiple political parties, and
244
limitations on executive power.
Clerical critics of the reform movement and many Iranian lay
religious intellectuals argue that Soroush fails to understand that

236.
Id. at 159, 163. Soroush "argues that in a democratic state, neither
Muslims nor non-Muslims derive their human rights from their faith. For both, these
rights are a product of their membership within the larger group of humanity." Id. at
163.
237.
Id. at 159.
238.
Id.
239.
Id. at 164.
240.
Id. at 161.
241.
Milani, supra note 9, at 29.
242.
Id.
243.
Takili, supra note 210, at 161.
244.
Id. at 161.
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religion in a democratic state is no longer central; it loses its
ascendency with the public and is relegated to status of an obsolete
relic from a bygone era. 245 A fundamental split between the Islamist
reformers and more conservative Islamists is their division on the
role of government institutions and the force of law in maintaining
religiosity in a society.2 46 Soroush contends that government can
provide a hospitable environment for religion to grow and prosper,
but that no form of government can make either individuals or a
The clerical elites and many lay religious
society religious.
intellectuals instead argue that law can be used to make people
religious and that government should use law to that end. 247 The
clerical elites argue that the reformers' notion of a religious
democratic society maintained through the faith of its people, their
religious consciousness being brought to bear through public
accountability, lacks the institutional foundations necessary to
maintain a religious society. 248 The clerical elites assert that without
the institutions of the faqih and the Council of Guardians, and
without strict ideological precepts enforced through the law, the
people under democratic governance and non-ideological law-making
would slip into an undisciplined, immoral, hedonistic, self-interested,
249
and generally irreligious existence.

245.
Id. at 162. Hamid Payidar, in countering Soroush's call for democracy,
argues that democracy is, inseparable from liberalism and secularism, thus
incompatible with Islam. He argues that Soroush's notion of equal human rights
external to Islam is in violation of Islamic separation and classification of the world
into segregated groupings of Muslims and non-Muslims, who are supposed to have
different, not the same rights.
246.
Id. at 163.
247.
Id. at 164.
248.
Id. at 164-65.
249i.
See id. 161-68. The clerical elites and lay religious intellectuals draw upon
history and philosophy to argue that this type of moral decay is inevitable, particularly
frequently appearing in these discussions is Plato's philosophy or Muslim scholars'
interpretations that are heavily influenced by Platonistic thought. Id.; see also PLATO,
supra note 29, at §§ 560e-562. Discussing the individual produced by a democratic
state, Plato states:
Draining and purging the soul of the captured youth, they put him through a
series of extravagant and gorgeous initiation rites.
Insolence, anarchy,
improvidence, and shamelessness are brought back from exile in colorful array
with garlands crowning their heads. In their train is a massive chorus praising
them: insolence they call good breeding; anarchy is liberty; improvidence is
grandeur; shamelessness is courage. Does not something like this happen to
the youth when he repudiates the training that limited him to the necessary
desires and gives free rein instead to the desires that are useless and
unnecessary?
.... He yields to each appetite as it makes its presence felt so that it appears
to be a matter of random choice. Then he gives himself over to it until he is
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Soroush chides his critics for what he perceives as their failure to
understand that individuals do not accept religion through force, but
only maintain an appearance of religiosity to conform with the law,
and that the government is doing little more by strictly enforcing
static clerical ideological interpretations upon the public than
building up resentment, frustration, impairing the growth of religious
250
knowledge, and eventually ensuring their (the clerics') own demise.

satisfied. After that, he turns to some other pleasure, rejecting none and
treating all as equally enjoyable.
...
He shakes his head at anyone who tells him that some pleasures are the
fruits of good and honorable desires but that others are joined to base
affections, so that we should honor and enjoy the former but restrain and subdue the latter. He repeats that one pleasure is as good as another and that
all must be accorded equal status.
...
So he lives his life day by day, indulging each appetite as it makes itself
His life lacks all discipline and order, yet he calls it a life of pleasure,
felt ....
freedom, and happiness and is resolved to stay the course.

So this is the democratic man, and we shall pair him with the
***
democratic regime.
PLATO, supranote 29, at §§ 560e-562.
One of the more hotly debated
250.
Vakili, supra note 210, at 169-70.
intellectual issues in Iranian intellectual circles is the decline of the Catholic Church's
influence in Europe, particularly because both reformers and conservatives are
interested in avoiding the same fate in Iran. Id. Soroush uses the Catholic Church
example to illustrate his point that grasping power too tightly and too directly will lead
to a decline in religion's influence, rather than it being preserved. Id. Soroush argues
that the clerics draw the wrong lesson in seeing the Church's decline in political
influence as being connected with its allowing greater liberty to external political
forces. Id. Quite to the contrary, Soroush asserts that the Catholic Church was
dethroned because it endeavored to exercise governmental and legal control to prevent
social, political, and intellectual change, rather than, embracing or at least tolerating
change. Id. at 170. If it had allowed greater leeway, then Soroush contends the laity's
reaction to the Church would not have been so negative. Id. Soroush argues that only
through these clerical elites abandoning the throne to return to being active
participants in constant process and development of religious knowledge can the role of
religion be preserved. Id. Only through this medium can Iran avoid what even the
reformers perceive as the negative experience of the West. Id.; see also ALEXIS DE
TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 294-301 (George Lawrence trans., 1969). On
the collapsing influence of religion in Europe, de Tocqueville stated:
Therefore with us there must be some accidental and particular cause
preventing the human spirit from following its inclination and driving it
beyond those limits within which it should naturally remain.
I am profoundly convinced that this accidental and particular cause is the
close union of politics and religion.
Unbelievers in Europe attack Christians more as political than as religious
enemies; they hate the faith as the opinion of a party much more than as a
mistaken belief, and they reject the clergy less because they are the
representatives of God than because they are friends of authority.
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Alexis De Tocqueville, a writer cited by President Khatami when
addressing the similar hopes of the people of Iran and the United
States, 251 explained the problems of the relationship between religion
and the state by making essentially the same point as Soroush:
There have been religions intimately linked to earthly governments,
dominating men's souls both by terror and faith; but when a religion
makes such an alliance, I am not afraid to say that it makes the same
mistake as any man might; it sacrifices the future for the present, and
by gaining a power to which it has no claim, it risks the legitimate
authority.

Consequently,

252

Soroush calls for a divide between the clerical

European Christianity has allowed itself to be intimately united with the
powers of this world. Now that these powers are falling, it as it if it were
buried under their ruins.
DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra, at 300-01. Alternatively, addressing the profound influence of
religion in the early American Republic, de Tocqueville stated rather concisely: "[A]ll
thought that the main reason for the quiet sway of religion was the complete
separation of church and state." Id. at 295.
251.
BRUMBERG, supra note 54, at 195-204, 234.
Recalling Alexis de Tocqueville's Democracy in America, Khatami noted that
the French statesman had attributed the admirable nature of American
democracy to the "fact that liberty found religion as a cradle for its growth, and
religion found protection for liberty as its divine calling."
This unique
relationship, he argued, was precisely what made America so appealing to
Iranians. [Khatami stated:] "We feel that that what we seek is what the
founders of American civilization were also pursuing four centuries ago."
Id. at 234. Both President Khatami and Soroush have adamantly asserted that there
is a need for improved relations between Iran and "the West" (in quotes, because both
these individuals attack the notion that the West is a monolithic entity wholly distinct
or separate from the Islamic world, which they argue is not a monolith in itself either).
Khatami has called for a dialogue of civilizations and the opening of Iran to the West,
but insists on a cultural strategy that will prevent the emergence of being "Weststruck"
or overrun by the cultural onslaught of the Western world. Vakili, supra note 210, at
171-73. Soroush indicates that a profound need exists for improved relations with the
West. Vakili, supra note 210, at 171-72. Soroush
argues that selective borrowing from Western culture can benefit Iranian
culture, provided that this borrowing is the result of free choice. [He contends
that] [t]he only way for Iranian culture to grow is for it open itself up to other
cultures, to interact critically and freely with developments from outside or
Iran. [He states that] [e]xcessive nationalism or excessive religious puritanism
threatens the rational climate necessary for cultural interaction and growth.
Vakili, supra note 210, at 172.
252.
DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 250, at 297; see also Vakili, supra note 210, at
150-76. The legitimate authority of religion according to both de Tocqueville and
Soroush is to guide and sway the individual hearts and minds of the people, rather
than through the exercise of power directly or through close alliance with
governmental entities. See Vakili, supra note 210; see also DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra
note 200.
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establishment and the exercise of temporal power. 253 He relies upon
a theory of religious consciousness that provides for religious elites
persuading the people; the people will, in turn, hold their
representatives accountable for implementing the religiously2 54
informed measures preferred by the public.
Conspicuously absent from this discussion of the reformist
movement and its philosophy is a long series of important legislative
initiatives that have been successfully implemented. The simple
reason is that this movement lacks effective legislative, judicial, or
executive power. 255 The Constitution of Iran created democratic
positions, such as an elected parliament and president, within a
system that essentially grants real power to a small clerical elite who
compose the Council of Guardians, and who are under the reign of a
Supreme Leader, the faqih.256 Nevertheless, the public discourse and
protest from the reformers-stretching from students on college
campuses to elected politicians speaking in the Majles (Parliament)is creating enormous pressures on the system. 257 This pressure is the
reason that clerical elites, who underestimated Khatami in the 1997
presidential campaign, are now moving to counter and suppress the
258
reformist movement.
This struggle is not over a particular policy or legislative
initiative; rather, it is a fight over the nature of law itself. Is law the
absolute and transcendent word of God in the form of religious text
interpreted by clerical elites who perform a Platonistic search for
truth? Or, is law created by the consent and consensus of the
governed, who are inspired but not controlled by religious
teachings? 25 9 The clerical elites refuse to surrender the ideological
state to the reformers' religious society. An effort is, therefore,
underway to suppress the reform movement.
5. Clerical Backlash
The clerical backlash following the landslide election of President
Khatami 2 66 fits within the broader concerns of the religious clerics,

253.
Vakili, supra note 210, at 169. Soroush calls for the clerical establishment
to withdraw from political and financial control, fearing that this could be used as an
axis for improper influence from religious leaders. Id. at 168-69.
254.
Id.
255.
Milani, supra note 9, at 94-95.
256.
See generally BRUMBERG, supra note 54, at 185-229.
257.
See id.
258.
Id.
259.
See generally Vakili, supra note 210, at 153-76.
260.
Shevlin, supra note 31, at 379-80 (noting that Khatami received 20.5
million otes out of the 29.1 million votes cast, performed well electorally in both the
more urban centers and the rural areas, and enjoyed particularly strong support
among those younger than the age of 25).
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who "have come to fear the position of the clergy in government and
"261
even for the fundamental principle of the Islamic Republic ...
Ayatollah Mohammad Reza Mahdavi-Kani, speaking for the
conservative clerics, warned against any attempt to diminish the
power of the faqih, by offering the following critique: "Beware! ...
When they dare to... say that the legitimacy ... of the guardianship
[of the faqih] . . . is based on popular demand, then nothing will be
left of your guardianship. . . . It is foolish not to prevent these
deviations in the name of freedom. '262 This backlash has involved
tightening controls on freedom of speech even among the elite
religious academics, who have traditionally received more freedom
from the government than the general public to express their views in
scholarly publications or within informal discourse. 263 Supreme
Leader Khamenei, wielding anti-Western sentiment and the
institutional resources of the office of the faqih as powerful weapons,
called upon allies in the cabinet, the Majiles, and the press in order to
force reformers to defend themselves against accusations of being
Western liberals hiding in Islamic guise. 264 For example, in response
to Ayatollah Montezari's criticism of the faqih as too powerful,
Montezari was charged with treason and labeled as criticizing Islam
itself.265 Also, the leadership council has used politically-motivated
prosecutions of Khatami allies, including that of Tehran mayor
Gholamhossein Karabaschi who was tried for corruption and
mismanagement. 266 Following the 2000 elections for the Majles, the
Iranian Parliament in which the reformists performed exceedingly
well, an attempt was made to assassinate the chief of staff of
President Khatami, Sa'id Hajjarian. 267 Indeed, not all assassination
attempts have been unsuccessful: several prominent dissident figures
in the reform movement have been killed by agents linked to the
government's Ministry of Information, which is its intelligence
agency. 268 These murders are indicative of the fraying of the ties that
bind the clerical elites and the weakening of the control of faqih.
Supreme Leader Khamanei and many other leading religious clerics
expressed publicly and privately their staunch opposition to such
action, yet they were unable to prevent forces within the government
2 69
from conducting these assassinations.
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263.
264.
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Id. at 381 (citing Stephan Kinzer, Voice for Change Makes Iran Vote a Real
TIMES, May 23, 1997, at A10).
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Freedom of the press has been even further restricted. For
example, the Jameyah, an important newspaper that is sympathetic
to the reformist movement and critical of the conservative ulama
(religious clerics), was forced to stop publication. 270 The clerical elites
determined that Jameyah was printing in violation of the
constitutional provisions relating to the role of the press in the
Islamic Republic of Iran: the "media ... must serve the diffusion of
Islamic culture in order to aid the further development of the Islamic
Revolution. To this end, there is benefit in the healthy encounter of
differing viewpoints, but the media must strictly refrain from the
diffusion and propaganda
of destructive
and anti-Islamic
qualities." 271 Seventeen reformist papers have been shut down since
the Majles elections in February 2000.272
Furthermore, the Council of Guardians successfully utilized its
impeachment powers to remove Minister Abdullah Nouri because he
allowed student organizations to conduct extensive public
demonstrations that were critical of decisions made by the faqih and
Council of Guardians. 273 Additionally, when the reformist candidates
performed well in the February 2000 elections, the Council of
Guardians declared the elections fraudulent and ordered new
elections. 274 In a move that shocked conservatives in the clerical
establishment, Khamanei, the faqih, intervened to prevent the
Council of Guardians from invalidating the results of the second
election, declaring the results official and ordering that the Majles be
275
seated with the reformist members included as representatives.
While the Majles has little actual power, this was seen as a
2 76
considerable symbolic victory for Khatami and the reformists.
Nevertheless, Adolkarim Soroush has been "banned from teaching,
writing, traveling, and public speaking, and at any given moment one
or more of these restrictions may be in place. '277 Certainly, the
Council of Guardians and the faqih have demonstrated their
willingness to exercise power to curtail the reformist movement, but

The murders of dissident intellectuals . . . amply demonstrated that
Khamanei's efforts to pacify conservative clerics without encouraging regime
hard-liners were unsuccessful. Indeed, the assassinations not only showed that
the faqih had failed to control a key part of the state's coercive apparatus, but
also suggested that Khatami could not shield his allies from the worst forms of
state violence.
Id.
270.
271.
272.
273.
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as demonstrated by Khamenei's decision to seat the Majles, despite2 or
78
perhaps because 211 of its 290 seats are now held by reformists,
there may now be emerging limits on the use of this power.

III. CONCLUSION

The Islamic Republic of Iran still endures more than two decades
after the Islamist revolution that ended the Pahlavi dynasty and
installed in power the religious clerical elites, who were embodied
both to the West and to the Iranian people in the person of the
Ayatollah Khomeini. The Islamist movement in most nations in the
Middle East and the broader Muslim world is a movement that exists
outside of the corridors of power. It focuses on increasing the
opposition to the existing regimes and policies through means
ranging from political protest, to political pressure directed at
influencing royal families and presidents, to acts and threats of
violence against civilians and the state. In Iran, however, the nation
has been captured by the dissenters, or as Professor Sayyid has
argued, the West's existential other has triumphed. 27 9 With the
increased attention focused on the Muslim world since September 11,
2001, reporters, columnists, analysts, and others have indicated that
dissatisfaction exists on the "Islamic street" with their rulers. 280 This
Note addressed the question of what this "Islamic street" or Islamists,
which is frequently what is meant by this term, want from their
The answer
government in terms of internal legal reform.
contradictory
often
and
complex
unfortunately is that exceedingly
goals are being sought by the Islamist movement. Nevertheless, the
Iranian Revolution and its aftermath provide an important glimpse
as it struggles to create an ideal Islamic State.
With the Shah deposed and the old regime washed away, the
Islamic Republic enshrined in law an understanding of this ideal
state using the Constitution of the Islamic Republic as a blueprint
drawn from the rubric of sacred texts. The rejection of Western
society that is embodied in this Islamic State is nowhere more explicit

Id.
278.
See SAYYID, supra note 4, at 1-5, 89 (noting that "[ilt is only with Khomeini
279.
that Islamism makes the transition from an opposition and marginalized political
project to a counter-hegemonic movement").
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280.
A23; Joshua Muravchik, When Tyrants Rule, Terrorist Will Rise, AUSTRALIAN, Dec. 26,
2001, at 9; Dr. Larry Diamond, Winning the New Cold War on Terrorism: The
Democratic-GovernanceImperative, Institute for Global Democracy, March, 2002, at
The Poor Arab Street,
http://www.globaldem.org/default.cfm?page=policy-paperl;
ECONOMIST AGENDA, July 3, 2002, at http://members.optushome.com.au/jiiball/
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than in two central areas of divergence between the West and Iran:
the relationship between religion and the state, and gender
segregation in the public sphere. As argued by Khomeini, in an ideal
Islamic State, and now in the Islamic Republic of Iran, there is no
separation of religion from the state. 281 The state exists only to assist
the fulfillment of God's will. 282 This could easily be dismissed as
nothing more than the classical justification of autocratic rule;
however, the democratic reform movement in Iran casts this
proposition in an interesting light by not disagreeing with
conservatives on the goal, but by disagreeing with the means
283
employed by the clerical elites.
One of the most important themes of the twentieth century legal
change in the United States and the broader Western world is the
gradual elimination of varying types of societal segregation including
religion, race, and gender-particularly in the public sphere. Iran,
however, has fundamentally rejected this concept of desegregation, or
the elimination of societal barriers with gender segregation being the
most obvious manifestation of this dissent. Although under the
Islamist view, men and women are theoretically equal before God, it
was, nevertheless, incumbent according to Islamist theory for the
State to establish a legal framework that recognized the differences
between men and women. From a Western perspective, this objective
of facilitating the different but equal natures of men and women
appears to result in little more than discrimination against women.
This discrimination includes the exclusion of women from studying
particular subjects in higher education, requiring the wearing of the
hejab by force of law, stripping women of custodial rights, making
divorce much easier for a man to obtain without requiring the
oversight of the court system, and allowing a return to relatively
unconstrained practices of legalized polygamy and sigheh
marriages. 28 4
Nevertheless, this concept of gender segregation
attaches strongly to Islamist notions of natural law and the
foundational requirements necessary for the preserving of Islamic
civilization in a world dominated by Western, anti-Islamic cultural
28 5
symbols and movements.

Shevlin, supra note 31, at 365 (citing HOMA OMID, ISLAM AND THE POST281.
REVOLUTIONARY STATE OF IRAN 62 (1994), that notes Khomeini's view that "there
should be no separation between religion and government in an Islamic state").
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The West and the Islamic world are two worlds separated by the
course of history and kept apart by differences in language, the arts,
religion, traditions, and values. When Khomeini and his supporters
looked at the Western world, they saw only an imperialist interloper
28 6
that was endeavoring to undermine their society and civilization.
When the West looked at Khomeini, they saw a radical cleric, who
taught hate and endeavored to lead his people down a path toward a
repressive life. 28 7 Although the differences between the West and the
Islamic world are significant in many areas, including the connection
between religion and the state and the role of women, it is, however,
in the understanding of what law is that the two are most
fundamentally divided. Drawing upon the Biblical and Quranic
traditions, it is as if the children of Issac and Ismael, the sons of
Abraham, learned different lessons from history about who and how
to trust. The West's secular faith, spurred by economic growth, social
development, and fears of totalitarianism, proclaims that the people
are to be trusted and with them sovereignty to reside. From this
sovereignty, the people derive the power to make law. The Islamist
movement watched the erosion of an empire; a civilization in decline
was conquered, plundered, and reduced by imperialists. 288 Societal
changes did not reflect their values and threatened their way of
life. 28 9 They pointed to corruption within, as well as the enemy
abroad, as the weakening agents.29 0 The answer for many Islamists
was not to trust the people, for the people are weak and can easily be
lead astray especially when temptation abounds. 29 1 . They instead
trusted the clerical elites to serve as paternalistic guardians to
protect and defend the State and its people. 29 2 They argued that; the

special protections for and walls around [women]," which is the concept that provided
the basis for Islamist gender segregation model of society).
BRUMBERG, supra note 54, at 77-78; see also ESPOSITO, supra note 155, at
286.
18.
See ESPOSITO, supranote 155, at 18.
287.
By contrast, the West stood incredulous before this challenge to the Shah's
"enlightened" development of his seemingly backward nation, and the
resurrection of an anachronistic, irrational medieval force that threatened to
hurtle modern Iran back to the Middle Ages. Nothing symbolized this belief
more than black-robed, bearded mullahs and the dour countenance of their
leader, the Ayatollah Khomeini, who dominated the media, reinforcing. in
Western minds the irrational nature of the entire movement.
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West provides a model of the loss of religion when democracy
emerges. 293 There is, however, resistance to this notion among
reformers, who argue that the West lost its faith not because of the
294
absence of religious control, but because of the excess thereof.
These reformers search not to change the Islamist goal of religious
growth and exploration, but to save it.
Bernard Bailyn writes that John Adams was shocked by Plato's
Republic to the extent that he concluded the text had to be intended
When Khomeini, a man well versed in Western
as satire. 295
philosophy, considered the concepts of the philosopher king and
guardians of city, he found inspiration to create the institutions that
he believed were necessary to create a virtuous, good, and just
society. Philosophical disagreement can and does exist as to whether
the state should be directed towards protecting rights or enforcing
responsibilities, between allowing freedom or creating virtue. To
continue with the Platonistic metaphor, the danger in the Islamic
Republic of Iran and to peace in the broader world is that the Faqih,
who comes as the philosopher king, may well be little more than the
tyrant. Khatami, the political leader, and Soroush, the philosophical
pen of the reform movement, offer an alternative path to that
presented by Khomeini, though they would argue they are merely
reinterpreting him. They insist that a corrupt people cannot be cured
by even the greatest philosopher king, or protected by the wisest
guardians, and that a virtuous people has no need for either the king
296
or the protectors.
Soroush and de Tocqueville have argued that religion that
remains separate from the state is far more powerful than religion
that becomes a part of the state because it can guide and inspire-a
more potent and legitimate influence than any lever of power
controlled by the state.2 97 The emergence of this insight within the
Islamist movement in Iran provides cause for hope. This insight
provides an avenue for the expansion of the seed of democracy that
was planted in the Iranian constitution as its struggles to grow into
something more than what it is and what it has been for the past two
decades. De Tocqueville and Soroush warn, however, that once
religion has become ensconced as part of the State, it could be

293.
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294.
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governmental entities. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 250, at 297; see also Vakili, supra
note 210, at 150-76.
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corrupted and turned toward the aim of preserving power, rather
than the inspiration of thought, faith, belief, and action. 298 Unlike
the Solidarity movement in Poland where the Catholic Church helped
stand against the Communist State, the barriers confronted by the
reformers in Iran include the clerical elites, who seem to have no
desire to surrender their control. Nevertheless, from the election of
Khatami against the wishes of Khamanei, to the written words of
dissent in women's journals, to student protests, and the ever
increasing numbers of voices in Majles standing to voice dissent, a
rising tide is emerging behind the simple premise that people have a
voice that must be heard. The reformists do not deny God, or
religion, or faith, or even the wisdom of the clerics that guard the
State. What they do deny is that the human apprehension of law can
299
be definite and absolute beyond change or revision.
The reformers argue that the development of the nation, and of
Islam itself, is dependent on expelling the notion that the clerics can
find some definitive version of God's law, as if it were merely waiting
to be discovered through the interpretations of Government
a
officials. 300 They argue that this notion must be replaced with301
concept that the people inspired by religion should make the law.
Whether the reformers will succeed and democracy will flourish in
the Islamic Republic is a question that can only be answered by the
course of history.
The next few chapters in the story of Iran will, however, answer
critical questions as to the course of Muslim world and its relations
with the West. Two of the most important questions are whether
democracy can survive in this soil, and whether future generations in
the Islamic world and the West will experience Huntington's "Clash
of Civilizations" or Khatami's "Dialogue of Civilizations." Huntington
argues that there are fundamental differences along ethnic and
religious lines between the West and the Islamic world that are
leading to conflict. 30 2 Khatami recognizes that real distinctions exist,
but believes that human experience embraces enough commonality to
allow for dialogue that can offer a shared peace, in place of bitter
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warfare. 30 3 An abiding faith in the nature of humanity inspires much
of the thought and philosophy of the reformist movement; with the
story still unwritten, there is still cause for hope.
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